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   THE	  EFFECT	  OF	  ECONOMIC	  CRISES	  ON	  PATENTING	  ACTIVITY	  ACROSS	  COUNTRIES	  DANIEL	  BENOLIEL*	  &	  MICHAEL	  GISHBOLINER**	  	   ABSTRACT	  
This	  article	  offers	  a	  conceptual	  and	  empirical	  contribution	  regard-­‐
ing	  the	  effect	  of	  economic	  crises	  on	  patenting	  activity	  across	  countries.	  It	  
does	  so	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  predominant	  general	  view	  that	  economic	  cri-­‐
ses	  flatly	  chill	  patenting	  activity	  for	  all	  countries	  alike.	  
Financial	  crisis	  literature	  commonly	  assumes	  that,	  during	  global	  fi-­‐
nancial	   crises,	   private	   enterprises	   consequently	   tend	   to	   retreat	   to	   the	  
safety	  of	  their	  domestic	  markets.	  These	  enterprises	  presumably	  react	  this	  
way	   because	   of	   the	   lesser	   familiarity	   of	   foreign	   markets,	   the	   currency	  
risks	  involved	  in	  international	  investment,	  and	  the	  uncertainties	  regard-­‐
ing	  the	  issue	  of	  how	  states	  will	  treat	  foreign	  assets.	  
This	   article	   acknowledges	   the	   idiosyncrasies	   underlying	   advanced	  
and	  emerging	  economies	  abridging	  the	  archetypical	  North-­‐South	  divide	  
while	   rendering	   separate	   patenting	   patterns	   in	   particular.	   It	   offers	   a	  
quantitative	  statistical	  methodology	  for	  the	  evaluation	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  
economic	   crises	   on	   patenting	   activity.	   The	   article’s	  main	   finding	   shows	  
that	   when	   analyzing	   patent	   application	   rates	   by	   proxy	   of	   applicants’	  
national	  origin	  (or	  shortly,	  ‘by	  origin’)	  applications,	  the	  influence	  of	  eco-­‐
nomic	   crises	  modeled	   through	   independent	   economic	   variables	   is	  much	  
weaker	  over	  emerging	  economies	  than	  over	  advanced	  economies.	  Conse-­‐
quently,	  when	  the	  economic	  variables’	  values	  rise,	   the	  probability	  of	  the	  
negative	  change	   in	  patent	  applications	  count	   falls.	  Surely	  this	  decline	   is	  
much	  steeper	  for	  advanced	  economies	  than	  for	  emerging	  ones.	  
The	   analysis	   possibly	   corroborates	   that	   in	   emerging	   economies,	  
where	  innovation	  is	  predominantly	  promoted	  by	  overseas	  multinational	  
corporations	   (MNEs)	   and	   foreign	   direct	   investments	   (FDI),	   patenting	  
activity-­‐related	   decisions	   come	   from	   outside	   the	   country	   and	   relatively	  
less	  as	  a	  response	  to	  economic	  developments	  within	  the	  country.	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   INTRODUCTION	  Economic	  crises	  have	  acutely	  disturbed	  normal	  functions	  of	  finan-­‐cial	   and	   monetary	   systems	   all	   throughout	   history.	   While	   economists	  diverge	  over	  the	  role	  of	  the	  financial	  sector	  in	  economic	  growth,1	  there	  is	   general	   agreement	   that	   economic	   crises	   diminish	   short-­‐term	  growth.2	  An	  economic	  crisis	  surely	  is	  marked	  by	  the	  often	  unexpected	  failure	  of	  banks,	  the	  sharp	  decrease	  in	  credit	  and	  trade,	  or	  the	  collapse	  of	   an	   exchange	   rate	   regime	   that	   diminishes	   the	   efficiency	   of	   a	   given	  economy.3	  Less	  is	  understood,	  however,	  about	  the	  exact	  impact	  of	  eco-­‐	  *	  Associate	  Professor,	  The	  University	  of	  Haifa	  Faculty	  of	  Law	  and	  member	  of	  the	  Haifa	  Center	  of	  Law	  and	  Technology	  (HCLT).	  This	  Article	  was	  presented	  in	  workshops	  at	  the	  Israeli	   Intellectual	  Property	  Academic	  Forum	  and	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Haifa	  Faculty	  of	  Law	  research	  forum	  in	  2014–2015.	  We	  wish	  to	  thank	  Alan	  Miller,	  Michal	  Gal,	  Dan	  Peled,	  Benjamin	  Bental	  and	  the	  participants	  of	  both	  fora.	  We	  thank	  Dr.	  Nitza	  Barkan	  for	  the	  statistical	  assistance.	  All	  disclaimers	  apply.	  **	  Dr.	  Michael	  Gishboliner	  is	  a	  research	  student	  at	  the	  M.A	  (in	  Patent	  law)	  program	  in	  cooperation	  with	   the	  World	   Intellectual	   Property	  Organization	   (WIPO)	   at	   the	  University	   of	  Haifa	   Faculty	   of	  Law.1.	  Economists	   have	   found	   a	   positive	   connection	   between	   the	   financial	   sector	   and	   growth	  since	  England’s’	  post-­‐industrialized	  revolution	  throughout	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  beginning	  with	  the	  work	  of	  economist	  Walter	  Bagehot	  in	  his	  1873	  manuscript,	  Lombard	  Street,	  WALTER	  BAEGHOT,	  LOMBARD	   STREET:	  A	  DESCRIPTION	  OF	   THE	  MONEY	  MARKET,	   (1873)	   (Homewood,	   IL,	  Richard	  D.	   Irwin	  (1962	  Edition)),	  followed	  in	  1969	  by	  John	  Hicks	  in	  his	  seminal	  book,	  A	  Theory	  of	  Economic	  Histo-­‐ry,	   JOHN	  HICKS,	   A	   THEORY	   OF	   ECONOMIC	  HISTORY	   (1969)	   (Oxford:	   Clarendon	   Press,	   1969).	  But	   see,	  Robert	   E.	   Lucas	   Jr.,	   On	   the	   Mechanics	   of	   Economic	   Development,	   22	   J.	   OF	   MONETARY	   ECON.,	   3,	   3	  (1988);	  Pioneers	  in	  Development	  (Gerald	  M.	  Meier	  &	  Dudley	  Seers	  eds.,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1984).	   Ross	   Levine	   offers	   a	   thorough	   literature	   review	   of	   this	   theoretical	   disparity.	   See,	   Ross	  Levine,	  Financial	  Development	  and	  Economic	  Growth:	  Views	  and	  Agenda,	  35	  J.	  OF	  ECON.	  LITERATURE,	  688,	  688	  (1997);	  Ross	  Levine,	  Finance	  and	  Growth:	  Theory	  and	  Evidence,	  1(A)	  HANDBOOK	  OF	  ECON.	  GROWTH,	  865,	  867	  (Philippe	  Aghion	  &	  Steven	  N.	  Durlauf	  eds.	  2005).	  
 2.  The	  biggest	  decline	  in	  growth	  of	  world	  output	  since	  the	  1930s	  was	  in	  the	  2008	  crisis.	  It	  decreased	  from	  a	  historic	  peak	  of	  5.2%	  in	  2007.	  The	  recession	  triggered	  by	  the	  burst	  of	  the	  “dot-­‐com”	  crisis	  in	  2001,	  in	  comparison,	  led	  to	  a	  growth	  decline	  of	  global	  output	  from	  4.8%	  in	  2000	  to	  2.3%	   in	   2001.	  See,	   Press	   Release,	  World	   Trade	  Organization,	   Trade	   to	   Expand	   by	   9.5%	  After	   a	  Dismal	   2009,	   WTO	   Reports—Press/598	   (Mar.	   26,	   2010)	   (on	   file	   at	  https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres10_e/pr598_e.pdf	  ).	  For	  a	  literature	  review	  of	  corporate	  conduct	  leading	  amidst	  economic	  crises,	  see,	  e.g.,	  Claire	  A.	  Hill	  &	  Brett	  H.	  McDonnell,	  Reconsidering	  Board	  Oversight	  Duties	  After	  the	  Financial	  Crisis,	  2013	  U.	  ILL.	  L.	  REV.	  859,	  860	  (2013).	  See	  also,	  Christopher	  M.	  Bruner,	  Corporate	  Governance	  Reform	  in	  a	  Time	  
of	  Crisis,	  36	  J.	  CORP.	  L.	  309,	  313	  (2011);	  Nicholas	  Calcina	  Howson,	  When	  “Good”	  Corporate	  Govern-­‐
ance	  Makes	  “Bad”	  (Financial)	  Firms:	  The	  Global	  Crisis	  and	  the	  Limits	  of	  Private	  Law,	  108	  MICH.	  L.	  REV.	  FIRST	  IMPRESSIONS	  44,	  44	  (2009);	  Aleksandar	  Nikolic,	  Securitization	  of	  Patents	  and	  its	  Contin-­‐
ued	  Viability	  in	  Light	  of	  the	  Current	  Economic	  Conditions,	  19	  ALB.	  L.J.	  SCI.	  &	  TECH.	  393,	  n.140	  citing	  Emily	   Chasan,	  Wall	   Street’s	   Estoric	   Assets	   May	   Be	   Trouble,	   REUTERS	   (Nov.	   8,	   2007,	   9:17	   PM),	  http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/11/09/businesspro-­‐column-­‐lifting-­‐dc-­‐idUSN0254788320071109).	   The	   “current	   inability	   of	   investors,	   issuers	   and	   rating	   agencies	   to	  accurately	  value	  the	  underlying	  assets	  .	  .	  .	  has	  worked	  to	  chill	  investor	  exuberance	  in	  asset	  backed	  securities	  investment,	  leading	  to	  a	  virtual	  trading	  freeze.”	  Id.	  at	  412.	  See	  also,	  discussion	  herein.	  	   3.	   	  See,	  Itay	  Goldstein	  &	  Assaf	  Razin,	  Three	  Branches	  of	  Theories	  of	  Financial	  Crises	  2	  (NBER	  Working	  Paper	  No.	  18670,	  2013),	  available	  at	  http://www.nber.org/papers/w18670.pdf	  (adding	  that	  the	  recent	  2008	  global	  financial	  crisis	  exhibits	  characteristics	  from	  essentially	  three	  types	  of	  financial	  crises	  in	  recent	  history,	  namely:	  banking	  crises,	  credit	  and	  market	  freezes,	  and	  currency	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  nomic	  crises	  at	  large,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  2001	  dot-­‐com	  and	  2008	  subprime	  crises,	   on	   economic	   growth.	   Arguably	   less	   is	   known	   about	   the	   exact	  relation	   between	   economic	   crises	   and	   patenting	   activity,	   and	   their	  measure	   as	   a	   proxy	   of	   such	   economic	   growth,	   regardless	  whether	   or	  not	  the	  measured	  economic	  growth	  is	  innovation-­‐based.	  Given	   the	   traditional	   flow	   of	   economic	   crisis	   theory,	   surely	   any	  comparison	  between	  the	  advanced	  and	  emerging	  economies	  abridging	  the	  North-­‐South	  divide	  may	   seem	   to	   indistinctly	   connote	   a	  decline	   in	  patenting	   activity	  due	   to	   economic	   crises.	  A	   closer	   look,	   however,	   re-­‐veals	   a	  more	   subtle	   reality	   across	   the	   development	   divide.	  While	   the	  2008	   crisis	   might	   be	   telling	   on	   how	   emerging	   economies	   similarly	  stand	  for	  a	   lesser	  decline	  on	  growth	  or	  possibly	   funneled	  through	  pa-­‐tent	  activity	  rates,	  a	  more	  principled	  analysis	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  economic	  crises	  on	  patenting	  activity	  is	  judicious.	  Part	  I	  presents	  the	  topic’s	  theoretical	  setting.	  It	  accounts	  for	  both	  economic	  crisis	   theory	  and	  patent	   law-­‐related	   literature,	  which	  frame	  the	   discussion.	   Part	   II	   presents	   the	   article’s	   empirical	   analysis	   for	  1997–2012	  with	  emphasis	  on	  the	  two	  global	  crisis	  years	  of	  2001	  and	  2008.	  These	   two	  years	   refer	   to	   the	  dot-­‐com	  and	   the	   subprime	   crises,	  respectively,	  which	  will	  be	  analyzed	  as	  to	  their	  effect	  on	  patenting	  fill-­‐ing	  trends	  across	  developed	  and	  advanced	  countries.	  This	  part	  offers	  a	  quantitative	   statistical	  methodology	   of	   the	   potential	  North-­‐South	   dis-­‐crepancies	  thereof.	  It	  is	  a	  logistic	  regression	  (logit)	  model	  for	  dichoto-­‐mous	   outcome	   variables.4	   This	   model	   connects	   a	   probability	   of	   the	  negative	   change	   in	   patent	   applications	   count	   (outcome	   or	   dependent	  variable)	  with	   a	   linear	   combination	   of	   income	   or	   independent	   varia-­‐bles,	  including	  country	  type,	  and	  economic	  variables	  and	  their	  interac-­‐	  crises).	  The	  authors	  add	  however	  that	  “different	  people	  have	  different	  views	  on	  what	  constitutes	  a	  financial	  crisis.”	  Id.	  at	  3.	  See	  also,	  FINANCIAL	  CRISES:	  THEORY,	  HISTORY,	  AND	  POLICY	  (Charles	  P.	  Kin-­‐dleberger	   &	   Jean-­‐Pierre	   Laffargue	   eds.,	   Cambridge	   University	   Press	   1982)	   (offering	   articles	   on	  financial	  crises	  presented	  at	  a	  conference	  held	  in	  1979).	  As	  for	  the	  unpredictability	  of	  financial	  crises	  from	  the	  early	  1960s,	  see	  the	  breakthrough	  work	  of	  Nobel	  prize	  winners	  Milton	  Friedman	  and	  Anna	  Schwartz,	  and	  later	  Charles	  Kindleberger,	  which	  confirmed	   that	   financial	   crises	   tend	   to	   be	   hard	   to	   predict	   ex	   ante,	   and	  may	   seem	   sudden	   and	  unexpected	  as	  they	  occur.	  See,	  MILTON	  FRIEDMAN	  &	  ANNA	  JACOBSON	  SCHWARTZ,	  A	  MONETARY	  HISTORY	  OF	  THE	  UNITED	  STATES,	  1867-­‐1960,	   (1963).	  See	  also,	   CHARLES	  P.	  KINDLEBERGER	  &	  ROBERT	  Z.	  ALIBER,	  MANIAS,	  PANICS,	  AND	  CRASHES:	  A	  HISTORY	  OF	  FINANCIAL	  CRISES	  (1978).	  Similarly	  for	  the	  recent	  global	  economic	  crisis,	  see	  Ben	  Bernanke	  &	  Mark	  Gertler,	  Agency	  Costs,	  Net	  Worth,	  and	  Business	  Fluctua-­‐
tions,	  7	  THE	  AM.	  ECON.	  REV.,	  14,	  14	  (1989)	  (“[c]rises	  are	  triggered	  by	  shocks,	  defined	  as	  unpredict-­‐able	   events	   affecting	   economy”).	   See	   also,	   the	   seminal	   book	   by	   Gary	   Gorton,	   GARY	   B.	   GORTON,	  SLAPPED	  BY	  THE	  INVISIBLE	  HAND:	  THE	  PANIC	  OF	  2007	  (2010).	  
 4.  Logistic	   regression	   accounts	   for	   the	   link	   between	   an	   independent	   variable	   and	   a	  categorical	   dependent	   variable.	   It	   is	   usually	   continuous,	   by	   using	   probability	   scores	   as	   the	  predicted	   values	   of	   the	   dependent	   variable.	   See,	   Glossary	   of	   Statistical	   Terms,	   STATISTICS.COM,	  http://www.statistics.com/index.php?page=glossary&term_Id.=391.	  
2015]	   EFFECTS	  OF	  ECONOMIC	  CRISES	  ON	  PATENT	  ACTIVITY	   319	  tions.	   The	   analysis	   first	   accounts	   for	   an	   annual	   time	   series	   of	   1997–2012	   at	   large,	   but	   then	   corroborates	   its	  main	   findings	   per	   the	   global	  crisis	  years	  of	  2001	  and	  2008.	  Finally,	  Part	  III	  offers	  numerous	  theoret-­‐ical	   ramifications,	   relating	   to	   the	   connection	   between	   patenting	   and	  R&D	  policy,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  connection	  between	  expenditures	  by	  multi-­‐national	  enterprises	  (MNEs)	  from	  advanced	  countries	  on	  both	  patent-­‐ing	  and	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  (FDI)	  in	  emerging	  economies.	  I.	  	  THE	  NORMATIVE	  FRAMEWORK	  
A.	  	  Economic	  Crises	  across	  the	  North-­‐South	  Divide	  Economic	  crises	  have	  been	  traditionally	  modeled	  as	  cyclical,	  peri-­‐odically	  appearing	  and	  at	  times	  erupting	  in	  downturned	  markets.	  Eco-­‐nomic	  crisis	  theory	  originally	  evolved	  along	  the	  clash	  between	  the	  two	  theoretical	  traditions	  of	  liberal	  economic	  theories	  of	  Hayek,	  inspired	  by	  the	  Austrian	  School	  led	  by	  Ludwig	  von	  Mises	  and	  the	  Keynesian	  post-­‐1930s	   Great	   Depression	   state	   interventionist	   economics.5	   That	   also	  explains	  why	   theories	  of	   economic	   crises	   are	  often	  assumed	   to	   inter-­‐twine	  with	   business-­‐cycle	   taxonomies	  modeling	   of	   periodic	  economic	  crises,6	   originated	   by	  Norwegian	  Economics	  Nobel	   Prize	  winner	  Rag-­‐nar	  Frisch,7	  followed	  by	  Austrian-­‐American	  economist	  Gottfried	  Haber-­‐ler8	   and	   leading	   business	   cycles	   scholar	   Victor	   Zarnowitz.9	  Notwithstanding	   the	   theoretical	   intricacies	   between	   financial	   crises	  and	  business	  cycle	  theories,	   financial	  crises	  clearly	  erupt	  within	  coun-­‐tries	  but	  also	  oftentimes	  across	  countries.10	  
	  	   5.	   	  For	   a	   seminal	   depiction	   of	   these	   two	   theoretical	   traditions,	   see	   NICHOLAS	   WAPSHOTT,	  KEYNES	   HAYEK:	   THE	   CLASH	   THAT	   DEFINED	  MODERN	   ECONOMICS	   (2011).	  Wapshott	   argues	   that	  while	  state	   interventionist	  theories	  of	  Keynes	  appeared	  to	  be	  correct	  so	  as	  to	  delay	  the	  Second	  World	  War	   in	   Europe,	   the	   liberal	   theories	   of	   Hayek	   appear	   to	   be	   gaining	   favor	   nowadays.	   See	   also,	  BERNANKE	  &	  GERTLER,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  3	  (Economic	  crises	  occur	  periodically	  in	  different	  countries,	  constituting	  a	  downturn	  phase	  of	  real	  business	  cycle.).	  	   6.	   	  Professors	  Brenda	  Spotton	  and	  Robin	  Rowley	  add:	  “This	  tentative	  connection	  may	  offer	  a	  means	  of	  deriving	  sensible	  bases	  for	  taxonomies	  of	  financial	  crises,	  fragility,	  and	  volatility.”	  See,	  Brenda	  Spotton	  &	  Robin	  Rowley,	  Efficient	  Markets,	  Fundamentals,	  and	  Crashes:	  American	  Theories	  
of	  Financial	  Crises	  and	  Market	  Volatility,	  57	  AM.	  J.	  OF	  ECON.	  AND	  SOCIOLOGY,	  663,	  675	  (1998).	  	   7.	   	  Ragnar	   Frisch,	   Propagation	   Problems	   and	   Impulse	   Problems	   in	   Dynamic	   Equations,	   in	  ECONOMIC	  ESSAYS	  IN	  HONOUR	  OF	  GUSTAV	  CASSEL,	  OCTOBER	  20TH,	  1933,	  171,	  171	  (1933).	  	   8.	   	  GOTTFRIED	   HABERLER,	   PROSPERITY	   AND	   DEPRESSION:	   A	   THEORETICAL	   ANALYSIS	   OF	   CYCLICAL	  MOVEMENTS	  (1937).	  	   9.	   	  Victor	  Zarnowitz,	  Recent	  Work	  on	  Business	  Cycles	   in	  Historical	  Perspective:	  A	  Review	  of	  
Theories	  and	  Evidence,	  23	  J.	  OF	  ECON.	  LITERATURE,	  523,	  523	  (1985).	  	   10.	   	  SPOTTON	  &	  ROWLEY,	  supra	  note	  6	  (“We	  are	  compelled	  to	  settle	  for	  much	  less	  than	  a	  com-­‐prehensive	   taxonomy,	   offering	   some	   distinctive	   strands	   of	   comparison	   of	   alternative	   theo-­‐ries	  .	  .	  .	  .”).	  
320	   CHICAGO-­‐KENT	  JOURNAL	  OF	  INTELLECTUAL	  PROPERTY	   [Vol	  14:2	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   economic	   crisis	   theory	   traditionally	  modeled	   the	  west-­‐ern	  hemisphere	   economies,	   surely	  not	   all	  major	   crises	   erupt	   in	   these	  countries.	  All	  six	  major	  international	  economic	  crises	  during	  the	  1990s	  started	  in	  developing	  countries.	  These	  began	  in	  Mexico	  in	  1995;	  Thai-­‐land,	   Indonesia,	   and	   South	  Korea	   in	   1997–1998;	  Russia	   in	   1998;	   and	  Brazil	  in	  1998–1999.11	  The	  economic	  crises	  later	  occurring	  in	  Interna-­‐tional	   Monetary	   Fund	   (IMF)-­‐labeled	   thirty-­‐two	   advanced	   economies	  represent	   a	   broad	   range	   of	   events	   with	   Japan’s	   1992	   national	   crisis	  starting	   an	   emblem	   “lost	   decade.”	   It	   being	   yet	   another	   developing	  country’s	   economic	   crisis,	   it	   ultimately	   expanded	   into	   a	   developed	  country,	  namely	  the	  U.S.	  mid-­‐1980s	  crisis.12	  Since	   the	   1960s,	   global	   political	   economy	   of	   private	   capital	   has	  grown	  to	  a	  volume	  where	  they	  now	  dwarf	  international	  trade	  flows,13	  periodically	  leading	  to	  global	  economic	  crises.14	  Thus,	  even	  aside	  from	  archetypal	   local	  national	  crises	  associated	  with	  major	  declines	  in	  eco-­‐nomic	  performance,15	  global	  crises	  can	  often	  erupt.	  The	  two	  chief	  glob-­‐al	   crises	   starting	   in	  developed	  or	   advanced	   economies	   are	   the	  2001–2002	   dot-­‐com	   global	   crisis16	   and	   the	   2008	   subprime	   crisis,	   each	   of	  
	  	   11.	   	  Lawrence	  H.	  Summers,	   International	  Financial	  Crises:	  Causes,	  Prevention,	  and	  Cures,	   90	  AM.	  ECON.	  REV.:	  PAPERS	  AND	  PROCEEDINGS,	  1,	  5	  (2000).	  	   12.	   	  These	   crisis	   episodes	   include	   the	   “Big	   Five”	   crises	   of	   Spain	   in	   1977,	   Norway	   in	   1987,	  Finland	   in	   1991,	   Sweden	   in	   1991,	   and	   Japan	   in	   1992.	   See,	   Carmen	   M.	   Reinhart	   &	   Kenneth	   S.	  Rogoff,	  Is	  the	  2007	  U.S.	  Sub-­‐Prime	  Financial	  Crisis	  So	  Different?	  An	  International	  Historical	  Compar-­‐
ison,	  98AM.	  ECON.	  REV.:	  PAPERS	  AND	  PROCEEDINGS,	  339,	  340	  (2008).	  	   13.	   	  Eric	  Helleiner,	  Explaining	  the	  Globalization	  of	  Financial	  Markets:	  Bringing	  States	  Back	  In,	  2	  REV.	  OF	  INT’L	  POL.	  ECON.,	  315,	  315	  (1995).	  	   14.	   	  See,	  THE	  FIN.	  CRISIS	  INQUIRY	  COMM’N,	  THE	  FINANCIAL	  CRISIS	  INQUIRY	  REPORT:	  FINAL	  REPORT	  OF	  THE	  NATIONAL	  COMMISSION	  ON	  THE	  CAUSES	  OF	  THE	  FINANCIAL	  AND	  ECONOMIC	  CRISIS	  IN	  THE	  UNITED	  STATES,	  xvi–xvii	   (2011)	   (hereinafter,	   “The	  U.S.	  Financial	  Crisis	  Report”)	   (“The	  changes	   in	   the	  past	   three	  decades	  alone	  have	  been	  remarkable.	  .	  .	  .	  Technology	  has	   transformed	   the	  efficiency,	   speed,	  and	  complexity	  of	  financial	  instruments	  and	  transactions.	  There	  is	  broader	  access	  to	  and	  lower	  costs	  of	  financing	  than	  ever	  before.”).	  See	  also,	  HELLEINER,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  331	  (detailing	  key	  political	  developments	  to	  explain	  the	  reemergence	  of	  current	  global	  finance).	  Helleiner	  further	  emphasiz-­‐es	   that	   “the	  key	   role	  of	   states	  was	   that	   of	   either	   liberalizing	   capital	   controls	   or	   refraining	   from	  tightening	  them.”	  Id.	  	   15.	   	  REINHART	  &	  ROGOFF,	  supra	  note	  12.	  For	  a	  thorough	  analysis	  of	  major	  national	  financial	  crises	  worldwide,	  see	  also	  the	  seminal	  book	  by	  Gerard	  Caprio,	  Jr.,	  Daniela	  Klingebiel,	  Luc	  Laeven,	  and	  Guillermo	  Noguera,	  Gerard	  Caprio,	  Jr.	  et	  al,	  
Banking	  Crises	  Database,	   in	   SYSTEMIC	   FINANCIAL	  CRISES	   341	   (Patrick	  Honohan	  &	  Luc	  Laeven	   eds.,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press	  2005).	  See	  also,	  Graciela	  L.	  Kaminsky	  &	  Carmen	  M.	  Reinhart,	  The	  Twin	  
Crises:	   The	   Causes	   of	   Banking	   and	   Balance-­‐of-­‐Payments	   Problems,	   89	   AM.	   ECON.	   REV.	   473,	   473	  (1999).	  	   16.	   	  See,	   e.g.,	  Walden	  Bello,	  The	   Capitalist	   Conjuncture:	   Over-­‐Accumulation,	   Financial	   Crises,	  
and	   the	  Retreat	   from	  Globalisation,	  2	  THIRD	  WORLD	  QUARTERLY	  1345,	  1351	  (2006)	  (depicting	   the	  global	   nature	   of	   the	   2001–2001	   dot-­‐com	   financial	   crisis	   by	   stating	   that	   “[s]peculative	   crises	  marked	   the	  deregulation	  of	   finance	  capital	   in	  different	  parts	  of	   the	  world,	  and	  one	  crisis	   in	  one	  market	  touched	  off	  another	  in	  another	  market	  in	  an	  increasingly	  unified	  global	  market.”).	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  which	  equally	  serve	  as	  a	  case	  in	  point.17	  Regardless	  of	  each	  crisis’	  intri-­‐cacies,	  the	  historical	  record	  surely	  finds	  striking	  qualitative	  and	  quanti-­‐tative	  equivalents	  across	  a	  number	  of	  standard	  financial	  indicators.18	  In	  continuation,	  the	  relation	  between	  economic	  crises	  and	  patent-­‐ing	   activity	   works	   essentially	   twofold.	   At	   a	   start,	   optimal	   patenting	  activity	  accelerates	  economic	  growth.	  In	  a	  prominent	  book	  titled	  Inno-­‐
vation	  and	  Its	  Discontents:	  How	  Our	  Broken	  Patent	  System	  is	  Endanger-­‐
ing	  Innovation	  and	  Progress,	  and	  What	  to	  Do	  About	  It,	  economists	  Adam	  Jaffe	   and	   Josh	   Lerner	   argue	   that	   suboptimal	   patenting	   activity	   may	  ultimately	  reduce	  economic	  growth	  altogether.19	  In	  balance,	  given	  eco-­‐nomic	  crisis	  conditions,	  the	  value	  of	  patents	  as	  competitive	  assets	  may	  increase	   the	   likelihood	   of	   firm	   survival.20	   As	   a	  whole,	   suboptimal	   pa-­‐tenting	  activity	  presumably	  catalyzes	  economic	  crises.21	  The	  relation	  between	  economic	  crises	  and	  patenting	  activity	  has	  a	  second	  highly	  significant	  effect.	  The	  latter,	  which	  is	  also	  the	  focal	  point	  of	   this	   article,	   is	   that	   economic	   crises	   may	   reduce	   patenting	   activity	  while	  at	  times	  reducing	  innovation-­‐based	  growth	  altogether.	  This	  line	  of	   thought	   indeed	  may	   seem	   to	   flow	   naturally	   at	   first	   sight;	   financial	  crisis	   literature	  has	  conventionally	  assumed	   that	  during	   international	  financial	   crises	   international	  market	  players	   consequently	   tend	   to	   re-­‐treat	   to	   the	   safety	   of	   domestic	  markets.	   The	   explanations	   herein	   are	  	  	   17.	   	  See,	   The	   U.S.	   Financial	   Crisis	   Report.	   The	   report	   was	   prepared	   by	   the	  Financial	   Crisis	  Inquiry	   Commission	  (FCIC),	   which	   is	   a	   ten-­‐member	  commission	  appointed	   by	   the	  United	  States	  government	  for	  investigating	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2007–2010.	  The	  U.S.	  Financial	  Crisis	  Report,	   confirms	  “it	  was	   the	  collapse	  of	   the	  housing	  bubble—fueled	  by	  low	  interest	  rates,	  easy	  and	  available	  credit,	  scant	  regulation,	  and	  toxic	  mortgages—that	  was	  the	  spark	  that	  ignited	  a	  string	  of	  events,	  which	  led	  to	  a	  full-­‐blown	  crisis	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  2008.”	  Id.	  at	  xvi.	  The	  U.S.	  Financial	  Crisis	  Report	  confirms	  “[t]his	  happened	  not	  just	  in	  the	  United	  States	  but	  around	  the	  world.”	  Id.	  To	  be	  sure,	  Section	  5	  of	  the	  Fraud	  Enforcement	  and	  Recovery	  Act	  of	  2009,	  signed	  into	  law	  by	  President	  Barack	  Obama	  on	  May	  20,	  2009,	  established	  the	  FCIC	  “to	  examine	  the	  caus-­‐es,	  domestic	  and	  global,	  of	  the	  current	  financial	  and	  economic	  crisis	  in	  the	  United	  States.”	  Id.	  at	  xi.	  	   18.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  REINHART	  &	  ROGOFF,	  supra	  note	  12.	  Reinhart	  and	  Rogoff	  further	  add:	  “Starting	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2007,	   the	  United	  States	  experienced	  a	  striking	  contraction	   in	  wealth,	   increase	   in	  risk	  spreads,	  and	  deterioration	  in	  credit	  market	  functioning.”	  	  
 19.  See,	  e.g.,	  ADAM	  B.	  JAFFE	  &	  JOSH	  LERNER,	  INNOVATION	  AND	  ITS	  DISCONTENTS:	  HOW	  OUR	  BROKEN	  PATENT	  SYSTEM	  IS	  ENDANGERING	  INNOVATION	  AND	  PROGRESS,	  AND	  WHAT	  TO	  DO	  ABOUT	  IT	  149–50	  (2004).	  	   20.	   	  See,	  Iain	  M.	  Cockburn	  &	  Stefan	  Wagner,	  Patents	  and	  the	  Survival	  of	  Internet-­‐Related	  IPOs	  (NBER	  Working	  Paper	  No.	  13146,	  2007),	  available	  at	  http://www.nber.org/papers/w13146.pdf	  (analyzing	  a	  sample	  of	  356	  newly-­‐listed	  firms	  at	  NASDAQ	  while	  concluding	  that	  firms	  were	  una-­‐ble	  or	  unwilling	  to	  seek	  patent	  protection	  were	  much	  less	  likely	  to	  survive	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  dot-­‐com	  bubble	  after	  2001).	  Cockburn	  and	  Wagner	  further	  conclude	  that	  firms	  with	  no	  patent	  appli-­‐cations	  had	  a	  much	  higher	  hazard	  of	  exiting	  the	  sample.	  Id.	  at	  22.	  
 21.  Jaffe	  &	  Lerner,	  supra	  note	  19,	  at	  150	  (“[t]here	  is	  a	  ‘crisis	  in	  the	  quality	  of	  issued	  patents’	  and	  further	  extrapolates	  this	  crisis	  to	  also	  be	  a	  ‘potential	  economic	  crisis’	  as	  intellectual	  property	  has	   increased	   in	   economic	   significance.”).	  But	   see,	   William	   L.	   LaFuze,	  Keeping	   Current	   with	   the	  
Chair,	  2	  INTELL.	  PROP.	  L.	  NEWSL.	  2,	  4	  (2005)	  (criticizing	  Jaffe	  &	  Lerner’s	  conclusion,	  whereby:	  “The	  logic	  employed	  by	  the	  authors	   in	  reaching	  such	  a	  dramatic	  end	  point	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  giant	   leap	  without	  substantial	  foundation.”).	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  again	  intuitive,	  given	  the	  familiarity	  of	  such	  financial	  operators	  or	  mul-­‐tinational	  enterprises	  operating	  in	  foreign	  markets,	  the	  currency	  risks	  involved	   in	   international	   investment,	   or	   uncertainties	   regarding	   the	  issue	   of	   how	   states	   will	   treat	   foreign	   assets.22	   A	   similar	   account	   is	  found	  also	  within	  business	  cycle	  scholarship.	  Economist	  Antonio	  Fatás	  noticeably	   has	   argued	   that	   economic	   output	   fluctuations	   constituting	  business	  cycles,	  such	  as	  economic	  crises,	  may	  affect	  long-­‐term	  growth,	  noting	  that	  this	  influence	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  stronger	  for	  less-­‐developed	  countries.23	  There	  is	  respectively	  also	  increasing	  theoretical	   literature	  that	  places	  capital	  market	   imperfections	  at	   the	  core	  of	  national	  or	  re-­‐gional	  crises	  in	  emerging	  market.24	  The	  impact	  of	  such	  economic	  crises	  on	  the	  twenty-­‐five	  IMF’s-­‐labeled	  emerging	  economies	  is	  said	  to	  be	  sim-­‐ilarly	   stronger	   in	   comparison	  with	   crises	  hitting	  advanced	  economies	  at	  first.25	  Given	   the	   traditional	   flow	   of	   economic	   crisis	   theory,	   surely	   any	  comparison	  between	  advanced	  and	  emerging	  economies	  abridging	  the	  North-­‐South	  divide	  may	   seem	   to	   indistinctly	   connote	   a	  decline	   in	  pa-­‐tenting	  activity	  due	  to	  economic	  crises.	  The	  World	  Intellectual	  Proper-­‐ty	   Indicators	   report	   for	   2010	   published	   by	   the	   World	   Intellectual	  Property	   organization	   (WIPO)	   reveals	   that	   most	   reviewed	   countries	  indeed	   experienced	   a	   slowdown	   in	   patent	   applications	   in	   the	   2008	  crisis.26	   Countries	   worldwide	   similarly	   witnessed	   a	   decrease	   in	   the	  numbers	  of	  patent	  applications	  filed	  in	  2009.27	  These	  transformations	  were	   measured	   by	   both	   national	   and	   regional	   patent	   application	  	  	   22.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  Mark	  Aguiar	  &	  Gita	  Gopinath,	  Fire-­‐Sale	  Foreign	  Direct	  Investment	  and	  Liquidity	  
Crises,	  87	  THE	  REV.	  OF	  ECON.	  AND	  STATISTICS,	  439,	  439	  (2005)	  (associating	  liquidity	  crises	  with	  low	  foreign	  investment	  and	  an	  exit	  of	   investors	  from	  crisis	  economies);	  HELLEINER,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  331	  (using	  the	  case	  of	  the	  1930	  international	  financial	  crisis	  as	  a	  case	  in	  point).	  	   23.	   	  Antonio	  Fatás,	  The	  Effects	  of	  Business	  Cycles	  on	  Growth,	  INSEAD	  AND	  CERP,	  at	  17	  (2011),	  
available	  at	  http://faculty.insead.edu/fatas/Recoveries%20Fatas%20Mihov.pdf.	  	   24.	   	  Economists	   have	   separately	   modeled	   financial	   crises	   also	   for	   emerging	   economies.	  These	   primarily	   focus	   on	   bank	   and	   currency	   crashes.	   See,	   Roberto	   Chang	   &	   Andrés	   Velasco,	  A	  
Model	   of	   Financial	   Crises	   in	   Emerging	  Markets,	   116	  Q.	   J.	   OF	   ECON.,	  	   489,	   499,	   n.17	   (2001)	   (citing	  Jeffrey	  Sachs,	  Aaaron	  Tornell	  &	  Andrés	  Valasco,	  The	  Collapse	  of	  the	  Mexican	  Peso:	  What	  Have	  We	  
Learned?,	  11	  ECON.	  POL’Y,	  13,	  14	  (1996)	  (providing	  evidence	   that	   the	  Mexican	  1994–95	  collapse	  was	  not	  anticipated	  by	  investors);	  Steven	  Radelet	  &	  Jeffrey	  Sachs,	  The	  Onset	  of	  the	  Asian	  Financial	  
Crisis,	   HARVARD	   INST.	   FOR	   INT’L	   DEV.	   (1998),	   available	   at	  http://www.cid.harvard.edu/archive/hiid/papers/eaonset2.pdf	   (arguing	   that,	   like	   the	   Mexican	  1994–95	  collapse,	  the	  Asian	  1997	  collapse	  was	  also	  not	  anticipated	  by	  investors).	  	   25.	   	  For	  theoretical	  literature,	  see,	  e.g.,	  CHANG	  &	  VELASCO,	  supra	  note	  24;	  Ricardo	  J.	  Caballero	  &	  Arvind	  Krishnamurthy,	  International	  and	  Domestic	  Collateral	  Constraints	  in	  a	  Model	  of	  Emerging	  
Market	   Crises,	   48	   J.	   OF	  MONETARY	   ECON.	   513,	   513	   (2001);	   Philippe	  Aghion,	   Philippe	  Bacchetta	  &	  Abhijit	  Banerjee,	  A	  Simple	  Model	  of	  Monetary	  Policy	  and	  Currency	  Crises,	  44	  EUR.	  ECON.	  REV.	  728,	  728	  (2000).	  
 26.  See,	  World	  Intellectual	  Property	  Indicators	  2010	  Report,	  WIPO,	  at	  21	  (2010),	  available	  at	  http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/941/wipo_pub_941_2010.pdf.	  
 27.  Id.	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  rates.28	  They	  were	  particularly	  witnessed	  by	  Patent	  Cooperation	  Trea-­‐ty	   (PCT)	   agreement	   application	   rates,29	   where	   for	   the	   first	   recorded	  time	  the	  number	  of	  applications	  filed	  through	  the	  PCT	  System	  dramati-­‐cally	  declined	  compared	  to	  the	  previous	  year.30	  A	  closer	   look	  however	  reveals	  a	  more	  complex	  and	  subtle	  reality	  across	  countries.	  The	  2008	  crisis	   in	  fact	  bears	  witness	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  advanced	  economies	  saw	  actual	  declines	  in	  growth	  output	  in	  2009	  of	   an	   average	   of	   3.2%.31	   In	   an	   intriguing	   comparison,	   however,	   the	  emerging	   economies	  were	   substantively	   less	   affected.32	   Their	   growth	  output	   in	   fact	   grew	   in	   2009,	   yet	   at	   a	  much	   slower	   pace	   compared	   to	  previous	  years.	  Their	  growth	  rate	  was	  on	  average	  2.5%	  in	  2009	  com-­‐pared	  to	  6.1%	  in	  2008	  and	  8.3%	  in	  2007.33	  While	  the	  2008	  crisis	  might	  be	  telling	  on	  how	  emerging	  economies	  similarly	  stand	  for	  a	  lesser	  de-­‐cline	   on	   growth	   or	   possibly	   funneled	   through	   patent	   activity	   rates,	   a	  more	  principled	  analysis	  of	  effect	  of	  economic	  crises	  on	  patenting	  ac-­‐tivity	  became	  timely.	  
B.	  Patenting	  Activity	  and	  Economic	  Crises	  Economic	  crises	  largely	  affect	  patenting	  prosecution	  and	  litigation	  fivefold.	  Economic	  crises	  surely	  carry	  such	  effect	  notwithstanding	   the	  discrepancies	   over	   the	   decline	   rates	   in	   patenting	   activity	   across	   the	  archetypical	  development	  divide	  when	  economic	  crises	  occur.	  First	  and	   foremost,	   the	  decline	   in	  patent	  application	  rates	  due	   to	  the	   2008	   crisis	   presumably	   increased	   relative	   patenting	   litigation	  costs.	  This	  was	  funneled	  by	  a	  surge	  in	  the	  willingness	  to	  sue	  competi-­‐tors.34	  In	  such	  conditions,	  a	  consolidation	  of	  patent	  portfolios	  may	  take	  	  
 28.  Id.	  
 29.  Id.	   at	   8.	   (“At	   the	   height	   of	   the	   economic	   crisis	   in	   2009,	   applications	   filed	   through	   the	  Patent	  Cooperation	  Treaty	  (PCT)	  dropped	  by	  4.5%,	  the	  first	  drop	  since	  the	  inception	  of	  the	  PCT	  System”).	  The	  WIPO	  report	  adds	  that	  PCT	  applications	  from	  the	  United	  States	  who	  is	  the	  largest	  user	  of	  the	  PCT	  System,	  dropped	  by	  10.8%	  in	  2009.	  Id.	  at	  51.	  	   30.	   	  Id.,	  at	  51.	  
 31.  Id.	  at	  14.	  (explaining	  that	  the	  actual	  declines	  in	  output	  in	  IP	  systems	  in	  Advanced	  econ-­‐omies	   in	   2009	   were	   most	   pronounced	   for	   European	   countries	   (for	   example,	   around	   -­‐5%	   for	  Germany	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom)	  and	  for	  Japan	  (around	  -­‐5%)).	  
 32.  Id.	  (adding	  that	  “This	  was	  mainly	  due	  to	  continued	  growth	  in	  developing	  Asia	  (notably	  China,	  India	  and	  Indonesia),	  but	  also	  growth	  in	  Africa	  that	  compensated	  for	  declines	  elsewhere”).	  
 33.  See,	  World	  Intellectual	  Property	  Indicators	  2010,	  supra	  note	  26,	  at	  14.	  	   34.	   	  For	   the	   European	   context,	   see,	   e.g.,	   EMMANUEL	   BAUD	   ANDREAS,	   EBERT-­‐WEIDENFELLER	  DOROTHÉE,	  WEBER-­‐BRULS,	  STEFANO	  MACCHI	  DI	  CELLERE,	  ALASTAIR	  MCCULLOCH,	  IP	  CLIENT	  STRATEGIES	  IN	  EUROPE,	   2010	   EDITION	   LEADING	   LAWYERS	   ON	   ANALYZING	   EMERGING	   IP	   TRENDS,	   BUILDING	   CLIENT	  RELATIONSHIPS,	  AND	  NAVIGATING	  EUROPEAN	  IP	  LAWS	  AND	  LEGAL	  SYSTEMS	  IP	  STRATEGY	  IN	  A	  PAN-­‐EUROPEAN	  ENVIRONMENT,	  2010	  WL	  3628954	  at	  *1	  (2010)	  (indicating	  that	   in	  the	  backdrop	  of	   the	  2008	  eco-­‐nomic	  crisis	  companies	  operating	   in	  Europe	  are	  now	  checking	   their	   intellectual	  property	  as	   the	  willingness	  to	  sue	  competitors	  has	  grown).	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  place.35	  This	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  leads	  to	  fewer	  patent	  applications	  being	  filed,	  and	  conversely	  to	  more	   legal	  disputes	  on	  patent	  applications	  al-­‐ready	  filled.36	  The	  European	  context	  serves	  a	  first	  prime	  illustration.	  For	  Europe,	  the	   2008	   global	   economic	  crisis	  has	   apparently	   led	   numerous	   indus-­‐tries	  to	  reduce	  their	  R&D	  budgets	  and	  expenditures	  for	  the	  application	  and	  maintenance	  of	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  (IPRs).37	  That	  is,	  as	  the	  number	   of	  both	   patent	  and	   trademark	   applications	   decreased.38	   Simi-­‐larly,	  within	   the	   South-­‐East	  Asian	   context,	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Thailand,	  evidence	  shows	  that	  litigants	  further	  seem	  to	  signal	  high	  rates	  of	  selec-­‐tiveness	  as	  they	  become	  increasingly	  mindful	  about	  obtaining	  the	  most	  cost-­‐effective	  IPR	  strategies	  including	  patenting-­‐related	  ones.39	  In	  Tai-­‐wan,	  moreover,	   there	  were	  78,425	  patent	  applications	   in	  2009,	  while	  there	  were	  83,613	  in	  the	  global	  crisis	  year	  of	  2008.40	  The	  growth	  rate	  for	  patent	  applications	  in	  2009	  thus	  decreased	  about	  6.2	  percent	  from	  2008,	  which	  is	  the	  first	  negative	  growth	  rate	  since	  2002.41	  Lastly,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  China’s	  State	  Intellectual	  Property	  Office	  (SIPO),	  the	  global	  eco-­‐nomic	  crisis	  has	  similarly	  decreased	  patent	  applications	  at	  large.42	  Im-­‐portantly,	  further	  investigation	  per	  the	  South-­‐East	  Asian	  case	  possibly	  
	  
 35.  Id.	  
 36.  Id.;	  For	  the	  U.S.	  and	  European	  contexts,	  see	  e.g.,	  Philip	  P.	  Soo,	  Enforcing	  a	  Unitary	  Patent	  
in	  Europe:	  What	  the	  U.S.	  Federal	  Courts	  and	  Community	  Design	  Courts	  Teach	  Us,	  35	  LOY.	  L.A.	  INT’L	  &	  COMP.	  L.	  REV.	  55,	  96	  (2012)	  (adding	  that	  the	  recent	  global	  economic	  crisis	  	  underscores	  the	  need	  for	  reducing	  litigation	  costs	  and	  further	  justifies	  a	  unified	  European	  patent	  system).	  
 37.  Id.;	  See,	  also,	  MANUEL	  LOBATO,	  NAVIGATING	  INTELLECTUAL	  PROPERTY	  LAW	  IN	  EUROPE	  LEADING	  LAYERS	   ON	   COMPLYING	   WITH	   REGIONAL	   LAWS,	   LEVERAGING	   NEW	   TECHNOLOGY,	   AND	   AVOIDING	  INFRINGEMENT	   ISSUES	   RECENT	   CASES	   IN	   SPAIN:	   A	   GENERAL	   FRAMEWORK	   OF	   IP	   LITIGATION,	   2011	   WL	  5618008	   at	   *4	   (2011)	   (Focusing	   on	   the	   Spanish	   case:	   “[t]he	   decrease	   in	  patent	  applications	   (a	  notable	  feature	  of	  the	  Spanish	  economic	  crisis)	  is	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  research,	  but	  not	  to	  decisions	  to	  avoid	  patent	  expenditure”). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  For	   the	   South-­‐East	   Asian	   context,	   see,	   PETER	   J.	   DERNBACH,	   IP	   CLIENT	   LAWYERS	   ON	  DEVELOPING	  A	  DEFENSE	  STRATEGY,	  NAVIGATING	  RECENT	  CHANGES	  IN	  IP	  PROTECTION,	  AND	  UNDERSTANDING	  THE	  IMPACT	  OF	  THE	  ECONOMIC	  CRISIS	  ON	  IP	  CLIENTS	  IP	  TRENDS	  AND	  NEEDS	  IN	  TAIWAN,	  2010	  WL	  2511572	  at	  *3	  (2010)	  (emphasizing	  that	  there	  certain	  types	  of	  demand	  inelasticity	  over	  relevant	  IPRs	  i.e.,	  filings	  of	  patents	  before	  there	  is	  public	  disclosure	  of	  an	  invention;	  ongoing	  trademark	  and	  copy-­‐right	   issues	  and	   lawsuits	  regardless	  of	   the	  overall	  economic	  crisis).	  Dernbach	  broadly	  concludes	  that	  in	  due	  to	  the	  economic	  crisis:	  “all	  of	  our	  clients	  have	  become	  very	  selective	  and	  mindful	  about	  obtaining	  the	  most	  cost-­‐effective	  IP	  strategies.”	  Id.	  
 40.  See,	   EDGAR	   CHEN,	  IP	   CLIENT	   STRATEGIES	   IN	   ASIA,	   2010	   EDITION	   LEADING	   LAWYERS	   ON	  DEVELOPING	  A	  DEFENSE	  STRATEGY,	  NAVIGATING	  RECENT	  CHANGES	  IN	  IP	  PROTECTION,	  AND	  UNDERSTANDING	  THE	   IMPACT	   OF	   THE	   ECONOMIC	   CRISIS	   ON	   IP	   CLIENTS	   CHALLENGES	   AND	   SOLUTIONS	   FOR	   IP	   ATTORNEYS	   IN	  TAIWAN,	  2010	  WL	  2511574	  at	  *2	  (2010). 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  See,	  Peter	  K.	  Yu,	  Five	  Oft-­‐Repeated	  Questions	  About	  China’s	  Recent	  Rise	  as	  a	  Patent	  Power,	  2013	  CARDOZO	  L.	  REV.	  DE	  NOVO	  78,	  85–86	  (2013).	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  reveals	  that	  this	  trend	  was	  mainly	  caused	  by	  the	  decline	  of	  applications	  filed	  by	  foreign	  entities.43	  	  Surely,	   the	  drop	  in	  patent	  applications	   is	  said	  to	  be	  temporary	   in	  reflection	  of	  the	  crisis’	  phase.44	  In	  fact,	  as	  of	  early	  2010,	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  Organization	   for	   Economic	   Co-­‐operation	   and	   Development	   (OECD)	  officially	   adjusted	   their	   growth	   estimates	   upwards.45	   Patent	   filings	  worldwide	   rebounded	   in	   2010	  while	   growing	   by	   7.2%	   in	   2010,	   after	  having	   fallen	  by	  3.6%	   in	  2009.46	   It	   is	  presently	  unclear	  what	  explains	  the	  decrease	  in	  patent	  applications,	  whether	  it	  either	  lack	  of	  research,47	  or	   the	   overall	   avoidance	   of	  patent	  expenditure	   consistently	   world-­‐
	  
 43.  EDGAR	  CHEN,	  IP	  CLIENT	  STRATEGIES	  IN	  ASIA,	  2010	  EDITION	  LEADING	  LAWYERS	  ON	  DEVELOPING	  A	  DEFENSE	  STRATEGY,	  NAVIGATING	  RECENT	  CHANGES	  IN	  IP	  PROTECTION,	  AND	  UNDERSTANDING	  THE	  IMPACT	  OF	  THE	  ECONOMIC	  CRISIS	  ON	  IP	  CLIENTS	  CHALLENGES	  AND	  SOLUTIONS	  FOR	  IP	  ATTORNEYS	  IN	  TAIWAN,	  2010	  WL	  2511574	  at	  *2	  (2010)	  (revealing	  that	  this	  trend	  was	  mainly	  caused	  by	  the	  decline	  of	  applications	  filed	  by	  foreign	  entities).	  
 44.  See,	  World	  Intellectual	  Property	  Indicators	  2010	  Report,	  supra	  note	  26,	  at	  14.	  (confirms	  that	   “While	   economic	   recovery	   after	   the	   2008	   global	   crisis	   has	   set	   in,	   the	   crisis	   has	   invariably	  affected	   patent,	   trademark	   and	   industrial	   design	   filing	   activity	   and	   is	   likely	   to	   have	   a	   lingering	  effect	  in	  2010	  and	  2011.”).	  	  
See,	  e.g.,	  Bratislav	  Stankovic	  and	  Mirjana	  Stankovic,	  The	  Selfish	  Patent,	  3	  CASE	  W.	  RESERVE	  J.L.	  TECH.	  &	  INTERNET	  195,	  195–196	  (2012)	  (adding	  that	  notwithstanding	  the	  recent	  temporary	  drop	  due	  to	  the	  economic	  crisis,	  the	  global	  number	  of	  patent	  applications	  has	  been	  steadily	  increasing);	  Peter	  K.	  Yu,	  Five	  Oft-­‐Repeated	  Questions	  About	  China’s	  Recent	  Rise	  as	  a	  Patent	  Power,	  2013	  CARDOZO	  L.	  REV.	  DE	  NOVO	  78,	  85	  (2013).	  Professor	  Yu	  explains	  however	  that	  post-­‐2008	  China’s	  patent	  applica-­‐tion	  growth	  rate	  has	  well	   recovered:	   “If	   the	  projected	  growth	  rate	   for	  all	  patents	  combined	   is	  a	  meager	  5.2%,	  China	  will	   have	   reached	   two	  million	  patent	   applications	  by	  2015.	  With	   a	   growth	  rate	  of	  about	  34%	  in	  2011”.	  Id.	  at	  86.	  He	  further	  foresees	  that	  “If	  the	  projected	  growth	  rate	  for	  all	  patents	  combined	  is	  a	  meager	  5.2%,	  China	  will	  have	  reached	  two	  million	  patent	  applications	  by	  2015”.	  Id.	  at	  86.	  	  
 45.  See,	  World	   Intellectual	   Property	   Indicators	   2010,	   supra	   note	   26	   at	   14–15	   (adding	   that	  “This	  was	  mainly	  due	  to	  continued	  growth	  in	  developing	  Asia	  (notably	  China,	  India	  and	  Indone-­‐sia),	  but	  also	  growth	  in	  Africa	  that	  compensated	  for	  declines	  elsewhere”).	  
 46.  See,	   World	   Intellectual	   Property	   Indicators	   2011,	   WIPO,	   at	   5	   (2011),	   available	   at	  http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/941/wipo_pub_941_2011.pdf	   (“That	  growth	  was	  driven	  by	  a	  steep	  filing	  increase	  in	  China	  and	  the	  US,	  which	  accounted	  for	  four-­‐fifths	  of	  worldwide	  growth.	  An	  all	  time	  high	  of	  1.98	  million	  applications	  were	  filed	  globally,	  consisting	  of	  1.23	  million	  resident	  applications	  and	  0.75	  million	  non-­‐resident	  applications.”).	  Similarly,	   the	  WIPO	  report	  adds	  that	  trademark	  filings	  worldwide	  grew	  by	  11.8%	  in	  2010	  compared	  to	  a	  5.1%	  increase	  in	  global	  gross	  domestic	  product	  (GDP).	  Id.	  	   47.	   	  See,	  WORLD	   BANK,	  Global	   Economic	   Prospects	   2010:	   Crisis,	   Finance	   and	   Growth	   (2010),	  
available	   at	   http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGEP2010/Resources/GEP2010-­‐Full-­‐Report.pdf	  (for	  evidence	  foretells	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  2008	  global	  economic	  crisis	  on	  R&D	  perform-­‐ers).	   For	   business	   cycle	   literature	   offering	   empirical	   work	   Business	   sector	   R&D	   expenditures	  correlate	  with	  gross	  domestic	  product,	  see	  D.	  Comin	  and	  M.	  Gertler,	  Medium-­‐Term	  Business	  Cycles,	  96	   AMERICAN	   ECONOMIC	   REVIEW,	   AMERICAN	   ECONOMIC	   ASSOCIATION	   523	   (2006);	   G.	   Barlevy,	  On	   the	  
Cyclicality	   of	   Research	   and	   Development,	   97	   AMERICAN	   ECONOMIC	   REVIEW,	   AMERICAN	   ECONOMIC	  ASSOCIATION	  1131	  (2007).	  There	   is	  however	  no	  empirical	  proof	  of	  a	   linear	  relationship	  between	  R&D	  expenditure	  and	  pa-­‐tent	  filing	  activity	  or	  innovation.	  See,	  World	  Intellectual	  Property	  Indicators	  2010,	  supra	  note	  26,	  at	  21	   (“In	   other	  words,	   a	   certain	   number	   of	   firms	  with	   relatively	   low	  R&D	  expenditure	   still	   file	   a	  large	  number	  of	  patents”).	  
326	   CHICAGO-­‐KENT	  JOURNAL	  OF	  INTELLECTUAL	  PROPERTY	   [Vol	  14:2	  wide.48	   The	   empirical	   data	   on	   this	   account	   in	   still	   overly	   general	   and	  incomplete.	  Moreover,	  for	  some	  developing	  countries	  the	  2008	  global	  econom-­‐ic	   crisis	   seemingly	   did	   not	   take	   down	   domestic	   patent	   applications	  counts.49	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  foreign	  patent	  and	  trademark	  applications	  have	  experienced	  decreases	  as	  shown	  during	  the	  same	  period.50	  Economic	   crises	   impact	   patenting	   activity	   in	   a	   second	  way.	   Eco-­‐nomic	   crises	   may	   reduce	   patent	   filling	   expenditures	   while	   hindering	  quality	   patenting.51	   There	   are	   numerous	   accounts	   of	   a	   demand	   in-­‐crease	  for	  patent	  prosecution	  discounts	  over	  patent	  filing	  fees.52	  Simi-­‐larly,	   there	   is	   worldwide	   evidence	   of	   savings	   over	   cheaper	   patent	  drafters.53	  Such	  changes	   raise	  new	  concerns	  about	   the	  quality	  of	   the	  patent	  protection,	  especially	  in	  terms	  of	  patent	  registrations.54	  To	  illustrate,	  in	  the	   context	   of	   the	   2008	   crisis,	   the	   European	   Union	   (EU)	   accordingly	  urged	   its	   member	   states	   to	   reduce	   fees	   for	   patent	   applications	   and	  maintenance	  by	  up	  to	  75%.55	  Furthermore,	  the	  European	  Commission	  adopted	  in	  2009	  a	  recommendation	  to	  the	  Council	  that	  would	  provide	  the	   Commission	   with	   negotiating	   directives	   for	   the	   conclusion	   of	   an	  agreement	  creating	  a	  Unified	  Patent	  Litigation	  System	  (UPLS).56	  Such	  a	  reduction	   in	   legal	   costs	   could	  permit	  many	  Small	   and	  Medium	  Enter-­‐prises	   (SMEs)	   to	   enforce	   their	   patent	   rights	   in	   all	   EU	   and	   European	  Patent	  Convention	  (EPC)	  countries.57	  In	  the	  same	  vein,	  in	  an	  output	  of	  	  
 48.  MANUEL	  LOBATO,	  NAVIGATING	   INTELLECTUAL	  PROPERTY	  LAW	   IN	  EUROPE	  LEADING	  LAWYERS	  ON	  COMPLYING	  WITH	   REGIONAL	   LAWS,	   LEVERAGING	   NEW	   TECHNOLOGY,	   AND	   AVOIDING	   INFRINGEMENT	   ISSUES	  RECENT	  CASES	  IN	  SPAIN:	  A	  GENERAL	  FRAMEWORK	  OF	  IP	  LITIGATION,	  2011	  WL	  5618008	  at	  *4	  (2011).	  
 49.  See,	   e.g.,	   YEAP	   LIN,	   IP	   CLIENT	   STRATEGIES	   IN	   ASIA,	   2010	   EDITION	   LEADING	   LAWYERS	   ON	  DEVELOPING	  A	  DEFENSE	  STRATEGY,	  NAVIGATING	  RECENT	  CHANGES	  IN	  IP	  PROTECTION,	  AND	  UNDERSTANDING	  THE	   IMPACT	   OF	   THE	   ECONOMIC	   CRISIS	   ON	   IP	   CLIENT	   MEETING	   IP	   CHALLENGES	   IN	   MALAYSIA,	   2010	   WL	  2511569	  at	   *2	   (2010)	   (adding	   that	   the	  number	  of	  domestic	  patent	   and	   trademark	  applications	  have	  in	  fact	  increased	  over	  the	  year	  2009).	  
 50.  Id. 
 51.  See,	  e.g.,	  JAY	  YOUNG-­‐JUNE	  YANG,	  IP	  Client	  Strategies	  in	  Asia,	  2010	  EDITION	  LEADING	  LAWYERS	  ON	  DEVELOPING	  DEFENSE	  STRATEGY,	  NAVIGATING	  RECENT	  CHANGES	  IN	  IP	  PROTECTION,	  AND	  UNDERSTANDING	  THE	   IMPACT	  OF	   THE	  ECONOMIC	  CRISIS	  N	   IP	  CLIENTS	  NEW	   IP	  PROTECTION	  CHALLENGES	   IN	  KOREA	  AND	  THE	  ASIA-­‐PACIFIC	  REGION,	  2010	  WL	  2511568	  at	  *2	  (2010)	  (for	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region	  includ-­‐ing	  South	  Korea).	  
 52.  Id.	   (“After	   the	  economic	  crisis,	   we	   noticed	   that	   many	   of	   our	   clients	   tried	   to	   reduce	  their	  patent	  filing	  costs.	  Many	  clients	  now	  demand	  very	  strong	  discounts	  for	  filing	  fees,	  or	  they	  try	  to	  change	  their	  IP	  counselors	  in	  order	  to	  hire	  cheaper	  agents.”).	  
 53.  Id.	  	  
 54.  Id.	  	  	   55.	   	  See,	  OECD,	  OECD	  Science,	  Technology	  and	  Industry	  Outlook	  2010,	  at	  126	  (2010),	  available	  
at	   http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-­‐Asset-­‐Management/oecd/science-­‐and-­‐technology/oecd-­‐science-­‐technology-­‐and-­‐industry-­‐outlook-­‐2010_sti_outlook-­‐2010-­‐en#page1	  	   56.	   	  Id.	  	   57.	   	  Id.	  
2015]	   EFFECTS	  OF	  ECONOMIC	  CRISES	  ON	  PATENT	  ACTIVITY	   327	  invited	  readers	  by	  the	  IP	  Review	  magazine	   in	  2009,	   titled	  State	  of	   the	  
IP	   Industry	   Survey	  2009,58	  most	  American	   law	   firms	   said	   clients	  were	  similarly	  reporting	  a	  reduction	  in	  budgets	  for	  acquiring	  and	  developing	  intellectual	   property.59	   Patent	   attorneys	   were	   consequently	   said	   to	  process	   fewer	   foreign	   filings	   and	   clients	   focused	   more	   on	   selling	   or	  licensing	   intellectual	  property	   than	  on	  acquiring	  or	   litigating	   intellec-­‐tual	   property.60	   More	   than	   a	   third	   of	   the	   companies	   surveyed	   stated	  that	  they	  would	  spend	  less	  specifically	  in	  patent	  and	  trademark	  protec-­‐tion.61	  In	  the	  backdrop	  of	  the	  2008	  crisis,	  clients	  significantly	  have	  said	  to	  put	  work	   ‘on	  hold’	  or	  to	  prioritize	  out-­‐licensing	  or	  divestiture	  over	  acquisition.62	  European	  and	  American	  evidence	  of	  an	  overall	  reduction	  in	  patent	  filling	  expenditures	  still	  fall	  short	  in	  accounting	  for	  the	  more	  subtle	  and	  complex	  trends	  abridging	  the	  north-­‐south	  divide.	  Third,	  the	  effect	  of	  economic	  crises	  over	  patenting	  activity	  embeds	  an	   institutional	   corollary.	   It	   possibly	   underscores	   the	   need	   for	   pa-­‐tent	  courts	   to	  encourage	   innovation	  and	   reduce	   litigation	   costs.63	  The	  current	  economic	  crisis	  thus	   possibly	   may	   accentuate	   the	   need	   for	   a	  unitary	  patent	  and	  an	  integrated	  patent	  court	  to	  encourage	  innovation	  and	  investment.64	  Fourth	  and	  in	  continuation,	  economic	  crises	  alleged-­‐ly	  increases	  suboptimal	  patent	  settlements	  and	  reduce	  court	  case	  deci-­‐sion-­‐making	   accordingly.	   Due	   to	   the	   2008	   crisis,	   presumably	   more	  settlements	   over	   intellectual	   property	   occurred.65	   This	   is	   particularly	  so	   given	   the	   high	   litigation	   costs	   over	   IPRs	   and	   particularly	  litigation	  over	  patents.66	  Fifth	  and	  lastly,	  economic	  crisis	  reduces	  the	  bargaining	  power	   of	   developing	   countries	   over	   intellectual	   property-­‐related	  goods.67	  To	  illustrate,	  in	  view	  of	  major	  national	  economic	  crises	  devel-­‐	  	   58.	   	  See,	   CPA	   GLOBAL	   IN	   ASSOCIATION	   WITH	   IP	   REVIEW,	   State	   of	   the	   IP	   Industry	   Survey	   2009	  (April-­‐May	   2009),	   available	   at	  https://ipcloseup.files.wordpress.com/2010/04/ip_industry_survey_final111.pdf	  (In	  an	  output	  of	  invited	   readers	   of	   IP	  Review	  magazine	  of	  whom	  around	  half	  were	  based	   in	   corporate	   legal	   de-­‐partments	  and	  the	  other	  half	  in	  law	  firms).	  	   59.	   	  Id.	  at	  4-­‐5.	  	   60.	   	  Id.	  	   61.	   	  Id.	  	   62.	   	  Id.	  
 63.  See,	  Philip	  P.	  Soo,	  Enforcing	  a	  Unitary	  Patent	  in	  Europe:	  What	  the	  U.S.	  Federal	  Courts	  and	  
Community	  Design	  Courts	  Teach	  Us,	  35	  LOY.	  L.A.	  INT’L	  &	  COMP.	  L.	  REV.	  55,	  96	  (2012).	  
 64.  Id.	  
 65.  STANLEY	   M.	   GIBSON,	   LITIGATION	   STRATEGIES	   FOR	   INTELLECTUAL	   PROPERTY	   CASES	   LEADING	  LAWYERS	   ON	   ADAPTING	   TO	   NEW	   TRENDS,	   IMPROVING	   COURTROOM	   TACTICS,	   AND	   UNDERSTANDING	   THE	  IMPACT	  OF	  RECENT	  DECISIONS	  FROM	  THE	  TRENCHES	  OF	  IP	  LITIGATION,	  2010	  WL	  1535345	  at	  4*(2010)	  (“I	  think	  we	  are	  seeing	  more	  settlements	  in	  the	  IP	  area	  because	  of	  the	  current	  global	  economic	  crisis,	  primarily	  because	  IP	  litigation	  is	  very	  expensive,	  particularly	  patent	  litigation.”).	  
 66.  Id.	  	  
 67.  Daniel	  Benoliel	  &	  Bruno	  M.	  Salama,	  Towards	  an	  Intellectual	  Property	  Bargaining	  Theory:	  
The	  Post-­‐WTO	  Era	  (with	  Prof.	  Bruno	  M.	  Salama),	  32	  U.	  PA.	  J.	  INT’L	  L.	  265,	  274	  (2010)	  In	  what	  are	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  oping	  country	  leaders	  such	  as	  India,68	  Argentina,69	  or	  Thailand,70	  finally	  succumbed	   to	   U.S.-­‐led	   pressure	   and	   signed	   the	  WTO-­‐led	   1994	   Trade	  Related	  Aspect	   of	   Intellectual	   Property	   (TRIPS)	   agreement.	   Professor	  Samuel	   Oddi	  elegantly	   labeled	   it	   a	   “polite	   form	   of	   economic	   imperial-­‐
ism”.71	  Instead	  of	  introducing	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  the	  transnational	  space	  we	  are	   told,	   the	   WTO	   has	   repeatedly	   become	   an	   instrument	   of	   U.S.-­‐led	  unilateralism.72	   II.	  THE	  MODEL	  
A.	  Overview	  This	   part	   offers	   a	   quantitative	   statistical	  methodology	   of	   the	   po-­‐tential	   north-­‐south	   discrepancies	   over	   the	   impact	   of	   economic	   crises	  over	  patenting	   activity.	   It	   is	   a	   logistic	   regression	   (logit)	  model	   for	  di-­‐chotomous	  outcome	  variables.73	  This	  model	   connects	   a	  probability	  of	  	  Tier-­‐1	  sanctions,	  such	  developing	  countries	  may	  be	  sanctioned	  by	  the	  governments	  of	  developed	  countries;	  and	  in	  what	  are	  Tier-­‐2	  sanctions,	  they	  may	  be	  sanctioned	  by	  the	  industry	  as	  well.	  This	  dual	  sanction	  cost	  structure	  is	  in	  reality	  the	  main	  way	  in	  which	  the	  post-­‐WTO	  intellectual	  proper-­‐ty	   framework	  may	  be	  said	   to	  have	  generally	  reduced	  the	  bargaining	  power	  of	  developing	  coun-­‐tries);	  Samuel	  Oddi,	  Nature	  and	  Scope	  of	  the	  Agreement	  TRIPS	  -­‐	  Natural	  Rights	  and	  a	  “Polite	  Form	  
of	  Economic	  Imperialism”,	  29	  VAND.	  J.	  TRANSNATL.	  L.	  415,	  426	  (1996).	  
 68.  For	  the	  seminal	  case	  of	  India,	  see	  A.	  Dutta,	  and	  S.	  Sharma,	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  in	  
Developing	  Countries:	  Evidence	  from	  India,	  WORLD	  BANK	  WORKING	  PAPER	  47524	  at	  5	  (2008).	  Dutta,	  and	  S.	  Sharma	  explain	  that	  due	  to	  the	  1989	  economic	  crisis	  in	  India,	  this	  country	  which	  during	  the	  first	  three	  years	  of	  the	  Uruguay	  round	  of	  trade	  negotiations	  led	  the	  opposition	  to	  the	  inclusion	  of	  patent	  and	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  in	  a	  GATT	  accord	  succumbed	  U.S.-­‐led	  pressure	  to	  sign	  the	  1994	  of	  the	  Agreement	  on	  Trade-­‐Related	  Aspects	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  (TRIPS).”	  Id.	  See	  
also,	  C.	  O’Neal	  Taylor,	  Linkage	  and	  Rule-­‐Making:	  Observations	  on	  Trade	  and	  Investment	  and	  Trade	  
and	  Labor,	  19	  U.	  PA.	  J.	  INT’L	  ECON.	  L.	  639,	  668	  n.114	  (1998);	  George	  K.	  Foster,	  Opposing	  Forces	  in	  a	  
Revolution	   in	   International	   Patent	   Protection:	   The	   U.S.	   and	   India	   in	   the	   Uruguay	   Round	   and	   its	  
Aftermath,	  3	  UCLA	  J.	  INT’L	  &	  FOREIGN	  AFF.	  283,	  315	  (1998).	  Argentina’s	  analogous	  economic	  crisis	  serves	  as	  yet	  another	  case	  in	  point.	  
 69.  For	  the	  case	  of	  Argentina,	  see	  also,	  Daya	  Shanker,	  Argentina-­‐US	  Mutually	  Agreed	  Solution,	  
Economic	  Crisis	  in	  Argentina	  and	  Failure	  of	  the	  WTO	  Dispute	  Settlement	  System,	  44	  ID.EA	  565,	  615	  (2004)	  (explaining	  how	  the	  Argentinean	  economic	  crisis	  and	  subsequent	  development	  have	  led	  to	  Argentina	  accepting	  terms	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  after	  resisting	  even	  minor	  adjust-­‐ments	  in	  its	  patent	  law	  for	  years).	  	   70.	   	  See,	  Rosemary	  Sweeney,	  The	  U.S.	  Push	  for	  Worldwide	  Patent	  Protection	  for	  Drugs	  Meets	  
the	  AID.S	  Crisis	   in	  Thailand:	  A	  Devastating	  Collision,	  9	  PAC.	  RIM	  L.	  &	  POL’Y	   J.	  445,	  462	  (2000)	  (“In	  1997,	   Thailand	   suffered	   a	   severe	  economic	  crisis	  that	   placed	   it	   in	   a	  weak	   position	   to	   resist	   U.S.	  attempts	  to	  dictate	  changes	  in	  its	  intellectual	  property	  laws.	  .	  .Thai	  government	  officials	  expressed	  hopes	  during	  this	  period	  that	  Thailand	  could	  finally	  be	  removed	  from	  the	  USTR	  watch	  list	  so	  that	  more	  of	  its	  exports	  could	  enjoy	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  GSP.”).	  (“U.S.	  pressure	  has	  resulted	  in	  amend-­‐ments	  to	  the	  Thai	  Patent	  Act	  that	  have	  cut	  off	  the	  possibility	  of	  parallel	  importing	  to	  obtain	  less-­‐expensive,	   generic	   versions	   of	   these	   drugs	   and	   narrowed	   the	   situations	   in	   which	   compulsory	  licenses	  can	  be	  issued	  to	  produce	  generic	  versions	  of	  AID.S	  drugs	  locally”)	  Id.	  at	  463.	  
 71.  See,	   Samuel	  Oddi,	  TRIPS-­‐Natural	  Rights	   and	   a	   “Polite	   Form	  of	  Economic	   Imperialism,”	  29	  VAND.	  J.	  TRANSNATL.	  L.	  415	  (1996).	  
 72.  Id.	   
 73.  Logistic	  regression	  measures	  the	  relationship	  between	  a	  categorical	  dependent	  variable	  and	  one	  or	  more	   independent	  variables,	  which	  are	  usually	   (but	  not	  necessarily)	   continuous,	  by	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  the	  negative	  change	  in	  patent	  applications	  count	  (outcome	  or	  depend-­‐ent	  variable)	  with	  a	  linear	  combination	  of	  income	  or	  independent	  vari-­‐ables,	   including	   country	   type,	   economic	   variables	   and	   their	   interac-­‐interactions.	   The	   analysis	   first	   accounts	   for	   an	   annual	   time	   series	   of	  1997-­‐2012	   at	   large,	   but	   then	   corroborates	   its	   main	   findings	   per	   the	  global	  crisis	  years	  of	  2001	  and	  2008.	  
B.	  Methodology	  The	  empirical	  analysis	  herein	  examines	   the	  effect	  of	  different	   in-­‐dependent	  variables	  as	  proxy	  of	  economic	  crises	  on	  dependent	  patent	  application	   procedures	   across	   countries.	   There	   are	   three	   such	   inde-­‐pendent	  variables.	  Firstly,	  these	  are	  countries	  by	  country	  group	  classi-­‐fication,	   namely	   countries	   belonging	   to	   the	   thirty-­‐two	   advanced	  economies	  or	  twenty-­‐four	  emerging	  economies.	  Secondly,	  the	  article’s	  independent	  variables	  include	  a	  set	  of	  three	  economic	  variables,	  name-­‐ly	  Gross	  Domestic	  Product	  (GDP)74,	  Gross	  national	  Income75	  (GNI-­‐PPP),	  both	   at	   Purchasing	  Power	  Parity	   (PPP)	   and	  Gross	  Domestic	   Expendi-­‐ture	  on	  Research	  and	  Development	  (GERD)76	  GDP	  and	  GNI-­‐PPP	  annual	  change	  data	  are	  available	  at	  World	  Bank,77	  whereas	  GERD	  annual	  time	  series	   are	   available	   by	   the	  OECD.78	   It	   further	   examines	   the	   statistical	  interaction	   between	   economic	   variables	   and	   country	   group.79	   Con-­‐cretely,	  the	  effect	  of	  these	  independent	  economic	  variables	  is	  examined	  	  using	  probability	  scores	  as	  the	  predicted	  values	  of	  the	  dependent	  variable.	  Logistic	  regression	  is	  used	   with	   binary	   data	   when	   you	   want	   to	   model	   the	   probability	   that	   a	   specified	   outcome	   will	  occur.	  STATISTICS.COM,	  http://www.statistics.com/index.php?page=glossary&term_Id.=391.	  
 74.  Gross	  domestic	  product	  is	  an	  aggregate	  measure	  of	  production	  equal	  to	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  gross	   values	   added	   of	   all	   resId.ent	   institutional	   units	   engaged	   in	   production.	   See,	  BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM,	   GDP,	   http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/gross-­‐domestic-­‐product-­‐GDP.html. 
 75.  Gross	  national	  income	  equals	  the	  total	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  output	  claimed	  by	  residents	  of	  a	   country.	   It	   consists	  of	  gross	  domestic	  product	   (GDP)	  and	   factor	   incomes	  earned	  by	   foreign	  residents,	   minus	   income	   earned	   in	   the	   domestic	   economy	   by	   non-­‐	   residents.	   See,	  BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM,	   Gross	   National	   Income,	  http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/Gross-­‐National-­‐Income.html.	  
 76.  Gross	  domestic	  expenditure	  on	  R&D	  includes	  expenditure	  on	  research	  and	  development	  by	   business	   enterprises,	   higher	   education	   institutions,	   as	  well	   as	   government	   and	   private	   non-­‐profit	   organizations.	   See,	   EUROPEAN	   COMMISSION,	   Eurostat,	  http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Glossary:Gross_domestic_expenditure_on_R_%26_D_(GERD).	  This	  economic	  variable	  was	  chosen,	  since	  patenting	   is	  usually	  seen	  as	  an	  output	  of	  R&D.	  
 77.  	  See,	  THE	  WORLD	  BANK,	  http://data.worldbank.org/.	  
 78.  See,	   OECD,	   Research	   and	   Development	   Statistics,	  http://www.oecd.org/innovation/inno/researchanddevelopmentstatisticsrds.htm	  
 79.  In	  statistics,	  an	  interaction	  occurs	  given	  the	  relationship	  among	  three	  or	  more	  variables,	  and	  describing	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  simultaneous	  influence	  of	  two	  variables	  on	  a	  third	  is	  not	  additive.	   See,	   Y.	   DODGE,	   THE	   OXFORD	   DICTIONARY	   OF	   STATISTICAL	   TERMS	   (Oxford	   University	   Press,	  2003). 
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  by	  means	  of	  comparing	  the	  probability	  of	  the	  negative	  annual	  change,80	  in	   different	   dependent	   patent	   application	   procedures	   for	   both	   ad-­‐vanced	  and	  emerging	  economies.81	  The	  first	  patenting	  procedure	  examined	  is	  that	  of	  counting	  patent	  applications	   by	   proxy	   of	   “Applicants’	   Origin”	   (or	   shortly,	   by	   origin)	  applications.	   This	   procedure	   shows	   worldwide	   patenting	   activity	   of	  applicants	   originated	   from	   any	   given	   country.	   It	   is	   important,	   since	  patenting	  activity	  of	  residents	  may	  be	  primarily	  affected	  by	  economic	  crisis	  conditions	   in	  a	  country	  of	  residence.	  The	  second	  patenting	  pro-­‐cedure	   examined	   is	   that	   of	   counting	   patent	   applications	   by	   proxy	   of	  “Filing	  Office”	  applications	  (or	  shortly,	  by	  office).	  It	  counts	  patent	  appli-­‐cations	  filed	  in	  the	  national	  patent	  office	  by	  all	  applicants.	  This	  proce-­‐dure	  was	  chosen,	  since	  that	  target	  of	  patenting	  in	  the	  specific	  country	  is	  promoting	  sales	  and	  suppressing	  competitors	  in	  this	  country,	  there-­‐fore	   economic	   crisis	   conditions	   in	   the	   country	   targeted	   for	   patenting	  may	  affect	  patenting	  activity	  of	  potential	  applicants,	   independently	  of	  their	  origin.	  The	  third	  patenting	  procedure	  examined	  is	  that	  of	  count-­‐ing	   patent	   applications	   by	   proxy	   of	   “Non-­‐Residents”	   patent	   applica-­‐tions	   (or	   shortly,	   non-­‐resident).82	   This	   procedure	   also	   counts	   patent	  applications	   filed	   in	   the	  national	  patent	  office,	  but	  only	   those	   filed	  by	  foreigners.	   This	   procedure	   was	   chosen,	   since	   country	   residents	   are	  more	  prone	  to	  file	  applications	  in	  local	  patent	  office	  than	  abroad.	  Eco-­‐nomic	   crisis	   conditions	   thus	   differently	   affect	   residents	   and	   non-­‐residents.	  Statistical	  data	  for	  all	  three	  patenting	  activity	  procedures	  are	  available	   in	  annual	   time	  series	   format	  at	  WIPO.83	   In	  order	  to	  base	  the	  analysis	   on	   the	   reliable	   data,	   time	   series	   over	   the	   16-­‐years	   period	   of	  1997-­‐2012	  have	  been	  chosen	  for	  all	  variables.	  For	  each	  patent	  applications	  count	  three	  logistic	  statistical	  models	  have	   been	   fitted.	   Each	   model	   examines	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   three	   inde-­‐
	  
 80.  The	   choice	   of	   probability	   of	   negative	   change	   as	   a	   dependent	   variable	   converts	   this	  variable	  from	  quantitative	  to	  categorical.	  In	  our	  opinion,	  this	  is	  more	  suitable	  to	  the	  target	  of	  the	  study,	  since	  one	  of	  the	  independent	  variables,	  namely,	  country	  group,	  is	  also	  categorical.	  Moreo-­‐ver,	   economic	   crisis,	   related	   to	   negative	   change	   in	   economic	   output,	   has	   a	   categorical	   sense	   as	  well.	  
 81.  	  The	   dependent	   variable	   represents	   the	   output	   or	   effect.	   The	   independent	   variables	  represent	  the	  inputs	  or	  causes,	  In	  our	  case	  variables	  were	  chosen	  with	  intention	  to	  examine	  the	  effect	  of	  economic	  crises	  on	  patenting	  activity,	  and	  not	  vice	  versa.	  	  	   82.	   	  The	   non-­‐resident	   patent	   applications	   count	   covers	   all	   patent	   applications	   filed	   in	   the	  countries’	  Patent	  Office	  by	  non-­‐residents	  (foreigners).	  
 83.  See,	  WIPO,	  Statistics,	  http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/.	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  pendent	   economic	   variables,	   namely	   GDP,	   GNI-­‐PPP	   and	   GERD.84	   The	  three	  types	  of	  models	  are	  analyzed	  henceforth.	  
C.	  Findings	  For	  each	  model	   the	   following	  hypotheses	  have	  been	  checked	  per	  every	  single	  independent	  variable.	  In	  relation,	  null	  hypothesis,	  H0,	  rep-­‐resents	   the	   article’s	   main	   counter	   argument	   whereby	   for	   each	   inde-­‐pendent	   variable	   it	   is	   assumed	   that	   no	   statistical	   difference	   is	  accounted	   for	  between	   the	   two	   country	   group	   classifications.	  That	   is,	  over	  the	  influence	  of	  each	  of	  the	  three	  economic	  variables	  on	  the	  prob-­‐ability	   of	   negative	   change	   for	   each	   patent	   applications	   procedure.85	  Consecutively,	   each	  H1	   hypothesis	   assumes	   the	   existence	  of	   such	  dif-­‐fering	  influence	  of	  economic	  crises	  on	  patenting	  procedures	  in	  compar-­‐ing	  advanced	  and	  emerging	  economies.	  From	  the	   results	   represented	  below,	   it	   follows	   that	   the	   influence	  of	  the	  explanatory	  variables	  on	  the	  negative	  change	  probability	  of	  dif-­‐ferent	  patent	  application	  procedures	  differ	  per	  each	  of	  the	  three	  patent	  application	  procedures	  reviewed.	  1.	  The	  Emerging	  Economies	  Patent	  Applications	  Bent	  At	  a	  start,	  when	  the	  patent	  application	  procedure	  by	  origin	  is	  fore-­‐casted, all	  modeled	  results	  shown	  below	  demonstrate	  significant	  inter-­‐actions	  between	  economic	  variable	  and	  country	  group	   type.86	  Models	  1.1	   –	   1.3	   presented	   in	   equivalent	   tables	   below	   followed	   by	   Figure	   1	  visualizing	   the	   regression	   equations	   obtained	   from	   these	   models	   for	  each	  of	  the	  three	  economic	  variables,	  namely	  GDP,	  GNI-­‐PPP	  and	  GERD	  show	   the	   results.	   From	   models	   1.1	   –	   1.3	   the	   noticeable	   influence	   of	  each	  economic	  variable	  on	  the	  probability	  of	  the	  negative	  change	  of	  the	  patent	  applications	  count	  by	  origin	  can	  be	  easily	  seen.	  That	  is	  while	  the	  influence	   of	   economic	   crises	   on	   patent	   application	   by	   origin	   count	  modeled	   through	   independent	   economic	   variables	   is	   much	   weaker	  over	  emerging	  economies	  than	  over	  advanced	  economies.	  Consequently,	  when	  the	  economic	  variables’	  values	  rise,	  the	  prob-­‐ability	   of	   the	   negative	   change	   in	   patent	   applications	   count	   by	   origin	  	  
 84.  For	  all	  three	  accounts,	  to	  forecast	  the	  probability	  of	  negative	  change	  in	  patent	  applica-­‐tions	  count	  logistic	  models	  have	  been	  chosen,	  including	  random	  factor	  of	  country	  and	  fixed	  effects	  of	  country	  type,	  specific	  economic	  variable	  and	  their	  interaction.	  	  
 85.  This	  null	  hypothesis	  sets	  the	  default	  assumption	  thereof,	  either	  because	  it	  is	  believed	  to	  be	  true	  or	  because	  it	  is	  to	  be	  used	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  argument,	  but	  has	  not	  been	  proved.	  
 86.  This	  is	  accounted	  for	  when	  p-­‐value	  less	  than	  0.01.	  Accordingly,	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  main	  effects	  is	  explained	  via	  this	  interaction.	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  falls.	  Surely	  this	  decline	  is	  much	  steeper	  for	  advanced	  economies	  than	  for	  emerging	  ones.	  Model	  1.1	  Forecasting	  probability	  of	  negative	  annual	  change	  in	  pa-­‐tent	  applications	  count	  by	  origin	  v.	   country	  (random	  effect),	  GDP	  and	  their	  interaction	  (fixed	  effects)	  	  
Solutions for Fixed Effects 	  
 
Effect           
 
Category     
 
Estimate        
Standard 
Error        
 




Pr > |t| 
       
Intercept                     -0.5736 0.1764 85.16 -3.25 0.0016 
GDP  -4.3319 2.6095   844 -1.66 0.0973 
Category Advanced 0.04615 0.2372 84.56  0.19 0.8462 
GDP*Category Advanced -21.9933 4.8672 843.8 -4.52 <.0001 	  Model	  1.2	  Forecasting	  probability	  of	  negative	  annual	  change	  in	  pa-­‐tent	  applications	   count	  by	  origin	  v.	   country	   (random	  effect),	  GNI-­‐PPP	  and	  their	  interaction	  (fixed	  effects)	  	  
Solutions for Fixed Effects 	  
 
Effect           
 
Category     
 
Estimate        
Standard 
Error        
 




Pr > |t| 
       
Intercept                     -0.3725 0.2001 164.1 -1.86 0.0644 
GNIPPP                         -5.7748 2.2697 836.6 -2.54 0.0111 
Category Advanced 0.02777 0.2684 164.5  0.10 0.9177 
GNIPPP 
*Category 
Advanced -10.5767 3.7438 828.5 -2.83 0.0048 	  Model	  1.3	  Forecasting	  probability	  of	  negative	  annual	  change	  in	  pa-­‐tent	  applications	  count	  by	  origin	  v.	  country	  (random	  effect),	  GERD	  and	  their	  interaction	  (fixed	  effects)	  	  
Solutions for Fixed Effects 	  
 
Effect           
 
Category     
 
Estimate        
Standard 
Error        
 




Pr > |t| 
       
Intercept                     -0.8082 0.1781 34.41 -4.54 <.0001 
GERD  -0.3765 0.5015   571 -0.75 0.4531 
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Category Advanced -0.09183 0.2373 39.03 -0.39 0.7009 
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  stronger.	  The	  effect,	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  Fig.1,	  is	  similar	  to	  GDP,	  but	  the	  difference	   between	   advanced	   and	   emerging	   economies	   is	   somewhat	  weaker.	  As	  for	  the	  third	  economic	  variable	  (GERD)	  influence,	  Model	  1.3	  shows	  that	  only	   the	   interaction	  of	  GERD	  with	  country	  category	   is	  sig-­‐nificant.	  Also	  in	  this	  case	  the	  effect	  is	  negative,	  but	  much	  weaker	  than	  that	  of	  two	  previous	  economic	  variables.	  This	  means	  that	  only	  a	  strong	  negative	   annual	   change	   in	  GERD	  would	   provide	   a	   negative	   change	   in	  patent	  applications	  by	  origin	  with	  high	  probability	  for	  advanced	  econ-­‐omies.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  for	  emerging	  economies	  patent	  applications	  count	  by	  origin	  is	  totally	  insensitive	  to	  annual	  changes	  of	  GERD.	  As	  a	  whole,	  when	  patent	  applications	  are	  counted	  by	  proxy	  of	  ap-­‐plicants’	  national	  origin	  applications	  (or	  shortly,	  ‘by	  origin’),	  	  the	  	  influ-­‐ence	   of	   economic	   crises	   modeled	   through	   	   independent	   economic	  variables	  is	  much	  weaker	  over	  emerging	  economies.	  That	  is	  in	  compar-­‐ison	   with	   the	   effect	   of	   economic	   crises	   over	   advanced	   economies	  across	  the	  north-­‐south	  divide.	  Put	  differently,	  when	  the	  values	  of	  eco-­‐nomic	   variables	   consequently	   rise,	   the	   probability	   of	   the	   negative	  change	  in	  patent	  applications	  by	  origin	  count	  falls.	  Surely	  this	  decline	  is	  much	  steeper	  for	  advanced	  economies	  than	  for	  emerging	  ones.	  But	  what	  might	   explain	   these	   findings?	   At	   first	   sight	   one	   recalls	  that	   in	   emerging	   economies	  where	   innovation	   is	   predominantly	   pro-­‐moted	   by	   multinational	   corporations	   (MNEs)	   and	   by	   foreign	   direct	  investments	  (FDI)	  -­‐	  decisions	  relating	  to	  patenting	  activity	  come	  from	  outside	  the	  country	  to	  a	  large	  extent.87	  Such	  investments	  are	  thus	  done	  less	   as	   a	   response	   to	   economic	   developments	  within	   given	   emerging	  economies,	  but	  as	  part	  of	  an	  international	  or	  at	  least	  multinational	  en-­‐terprise.	  On	  that	  account,	  one	  should	  recall	   the	  marginal	  number	  of	  MNEs	  originating	   from	   the	   developing	   world	   with	   emphasis	   on	   emerging	  economies.	   The	   United	   Nations	   Conference	   on	   Trade	   and	   Develop-­‐ment’s	   (UNCTAD)	   seminal	   2005	   World	   Investment	   Report	   comes	   to	  mind.	   UNCTAD’s	   2005	   investment	   report	   was	   pivotal	   as	   of	   2005	   in	  	  
 87.  On	   the	   role	  of	  MNEs	   in	  patenting	  activity	   and	   innovation	   in	  developing	   countries,	   see,	  
generally,	  Shih-­‐Fen	  S.	  Chen,	  Extending	  Internalization	  Theory:	  A	  New	  Perspective	  on	  International	  
Technology	  Transfer	  and	   its	  Generalization,	   36	   J.	   INT’L	  BUS.	   STUD.	  231,	  232	   (2005)	   (assessing	   the	  high	   degree	   of	   control	   that	   MNEs	   have	   over	   their	   technology	   in	   developing	   countries);	  Xavier	  Martin	   &	   Robert	   Salomon,	  Tacitness,	   Learning,	   and	   International	   Expansion:	   A	   Study	   of	   Foreign	  
Direct	  Investment	  in	  a	  Knowledge-­‐Intensive	  Industry,	  14	  ORG.	  SCI.	  297,	  298	  (2003)	  (focusing	  on	  the	  knowledge	  based	  assets,	   such	  as	   technological	   intelligence	  which	  MNEs	   from	  overseas	  bring	   to	  developing	  countries);	  Nicholas	  C.	  Georgantzas,	  MNE	  Competitiveness:	  A	  Scenario-­‐Driven	  Technol-­‐
ogy	  Transfer	  Construct,	  12	  MANAGERIAL	  &	  DECISION	  ECON.	  281,	  282-­‐83	  (1991)	  (depicting	  the	  domi-­‐nant	  role	  of	  MNEs	  in	  developing	  countries	  in	  introducing	  new	  technologies	  and	  the	  competition	  between	  MNEs	  thereof).	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  explaining	  how	  over	  eighty	  percent	  of	  the	  seven	  hundred	  largest	  R&D	  spending	   firms	  come	   from	  only	   five	  advanced	  economies,	  namely	   the	  United	  States,	  Japan,	  Germany,	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  France,	  in	  de-­‐scending	  order.88	  Only	  one	  percent	  of	  the	  top	  seven	  hundred	  are	  based	  in	   developing	   countries	   or	   South-­‐East	   Europe	   and	   the	   former	   Soviet	  Bloc’s	  Commonwealth	  of	  Independent	  States	  (CIS).89	  Within	  the	  list	  of	  MNEs	  from	  developing	  countries	  almost	  all	  these	  firms	  are	  concentrat-­‐ed	  in	  East	  Asia,	  notably	  from	  the	  Republic	  of	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan	  Prov-­‐ince	  of	  China.90	  This	  remarkably	  highly	  centralized	  nature	  of	  MNEs	  then	  helps	   to	  understand	  the	  WIPO	  2010	  Indicators	  report	  which	  further	  illustrates	  how	  in	  2010,	  resident	  applications	  accounted	  for	  57.4%	  of	  total	  appli-­‐cations	   in	   high-­‐income	   and	   52.3%	   in	  middle-­‐income	   economies.	   The	  report’s	  main	   finding	  however	  was	   that	  by	  means	  of	   comparison,	   the	  resident	   share	   of	   middle-­‐income	   economies	   largely	   incorporating	  emerging	  economies	  (yet	  excluding	  China’s	  State	  Intellectual	  Property	  Office	   (SIPO)),	   is	   only	   30.8%.91	   Moreover,	   in	   certain	   adherence	   with	  UNCTAD’	  2005	  earlier	  findings,	  the	  WIPO	  report	  shows	  that	  only	  a	  fifth	  of	  all	  applications	  in	  low-­‐income	  economies	  are	  again	  resident	  applica-­‐tions.92	  Likewise,	  another	  2010	  survey	  involving	  300	  of	  the	  largest	  U.S.	  companies	  engaged	  in	  outsourcing	  reveals	  how	  a	  remarkable	  share	  of	  77%	  of	  their	  outsourcing	  activity	  is	  again	  international.93	  Outsourcing	  is	   thus	   less	  affected	  by	  economic	  crises	  per	   their	   impact	  on	  emerging	  economies.94	  	  
 88.  See,	  UNCTAD,	  World	   Investment	  Report,	  NEW	  YORK	   AND	  GENEVA,	  UNITED	  NATIONS	   at	   121	  (2005),	   available	  at	  http://unctad.org/en/Docs/wir2005_en.pdf	   (Table	   IV.2).	  The	   IMF’s	  Balance	  of	  Payments	  Manual	   (fifth	  edition,	  1993)	  and	  the	  OECD	  Benchmark	  Definition	  of	  Foreign	  Direct	  Investment	  (third	  edition,	  1995)	  provide	  agreed	  guidelines	  for	  compiling	  FDI	  flows.	  See	  also,	  Id.	  at	  16-­‐17.	  
 89.  Id.	  at	  120.	  (Table	  IV.1.)	  	  Several	  countries	  have	  moved	  up	  the	  ranks	  since	  the	  late	  1990s.	  
Id. 
 90.  Id.	   at	  121	  (Table	   IV.2.)	   In	  balance,	  only	  one	  MNC	  comes	   from	  Africa	  and	  two	  are	   from	  Latin	  America.	  Id.	  
 91.  See,	  World	  Intellectual	  Property	  Indicators	  2010,	  supra	  note	  26,	  at	  40. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  These	   findings	   concerning	   outsourcing	   rates	   corroborate	   the	   concentration	   of	   MNEs	  operating	  in	  emerging	  economies,	  while	  presiding	  in	  developed	  countries.	  See,	  Capgemini,	  Latin	  America	   is	   the	   third	   most	   popular	   outsourcing	   destination	   (2010),	   at:	  http://apps.us.capgemini.com/DownloadLibrary/files/factsheets/Capgemini_BPO_LatAmOSdest_fs0610.pdf	   (The	  most	   important	   outsourcing	   destination	   is	   India	   used	   by	   60%	  of	   the	   surveyed	  companies.	   It	   is	   followed	  by	  China	  with	  27%	  and	  Latin	  America	  (excl.	  Mexico)	  with	  25%.	  Other	  Asian	  countries	  are	  less	  important	  with	  16%	  just	  like	  Western	  Europe	  with	  14%,	  Canada	  (12%)	  and	   Mexico	   (9%)).	   Two	   caveats	   apply.	   Firstly,	   the	   survey	   does	   not	   connote	   outsourcing	   with	  innovative	   activity	   such	   as	   patenting.	   Secondly,	   the	   survey	   does	   not	   relate	   the	   proportion	   of	  outsourcers	  to	  the	  total	  number	  of	  MNEs	  as	  opposed	  to	  smaller	  companies.	  Id.	  
 94.  	  Id.	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  In	  continuation,	  firms	  of	  different	  sizes	  also	  differ	  substantially	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  financial	  crises	  on	  their	  partly	  related	  innovation	  performance.95	   Surely,	   not	   all	   patenting	   activity	   directly	   connotes	   in-­‐novation,	  yet	  the	  relation	  is	  outsized.	  In	  such	  cases,	   larger	  firms	  more	  readily	  accommodate	  shocks	  to	  sales	  given	  both	  their	  internal	  financial	  resources	  as	  well	  as	  larger	  access	  to	  external	  financial	  resources.96	  By	  the	   same	   token,	   a	   2011	  OECD	   survey	   of	  manufacturing	   companies	   in	  Austria,	   France,	   Germany,	   Hungary,	   Italy,	   Spain	   and	   the	  United	   King-­‐dom	  shows	  how	  innovative	  companies	  witnessed	  a	  smaller	  decrease	  in	  sales.97	   Multinational	   enterprises	   continuously	   are	   archetypal	   trans-­‐ferors	  of	   technology	  and	   innovation	  across	  borders.98	  That	   is,	   as	   they	  engage	   in	   FDI	   and	   other	   forms	   of	   cross-­‐border	   value-­‐adding	   activity	  including	  patent	  prosecution.99	  Beyond	  the	  distinctive	  financial	  endurance	  of	  MNEs,	  there	  stands	  an	  explanation	  as	  to	  why	  patent	  application	  rated	  by	  origin	  decreased	  less	  in	  emerging	  economies	  inflicted	  by	  economic	  crises.	  As	  numerous	  economic	   crises	   literature	   studies	   further	  observe,	   global	   shocks	  pre-­‐dominantly	  affect	  advanced	  economies.100	  Less-­‐developed	  and	  emerg-­‐ing	  economies	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  depend	  exclusively	  on	  idiosyncratic	  shocks,	   and	   thus	   are	   less	   vulnerable	   to	   crisis	   spread.101	   World	   re-­‐nowned	  Chilean	  Economist	  Ricardo	  Ffench-­‐Davis	  further	  explains	  that	  the	  major	   source	  of	  economic	   fluctuations	   in	  emerging	  economies	   in-­‐deed	  are	  external	  shocks,	  which	  are	  essentially	  exogenous,	  and	  gener-­‐ally	   independent	  of	  economic	  policies	   in	   these	  countries.	  So	  much	  so,	  as	   emerging	   economies	   may	   still	   be	   affected	   by	   some	   domestic	   fac-­‐tors.102	  During	  the	  2008	  global	  crisis	  to	  illustrate,	  emerging	  economies	  	  	   95.	   	  See,	  OCED,	  OCED	  Science,	  Technology	  and	   Industry	  Outlook	  2012,	   at	   31-­‐32,	  available	   at	  http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-­‐Asset-­‐Management/oecd/science-­‐and-­‐technology/oecd-­‐science-­‐technology-­‐and-­‐industry-­‐outlook-­‐2012_sti_outlook-­‐2012-­‐en#page1	   (concerning	   the	  2008	  global	  economic	  crisis).	  	   96.	   	  Id.	   (“Large	   firms	   used	   internal	   financial	   resources	   to	   make	   fewer	   cuts	   to	   innovation	  investments	  during	  the	  downturn	  and	  thus	  smooth	  their	  innovation	  investments	  over	  time”).	  	   97.	   	  See,	  Id.	  at	  33	  (referring	  to	  G.	  Békés,	  L.	  Halpern,	  M.	  Koren	  and	  B.	  Muraközy,	  Still	  standing:	  how	  European	  firms	  weathered	  the	  crisis,	  The	  third	  EFIGE	  policy	  report,	  Bruegel,	  22	  December	  2011	  (2011)).	  	   98.	   	  P.	   J.	   BUCKLEY	   AND	  M.	   C.	   CASSON,	   THE	   FUTURE	   OF	   THE	   MULTINATIONAL	   ENTERPRISE,	   (London:	  Macmillan)	  (1976). 	   99.	   	  Id. 	   100.	   	  Troy	  Matheson,	  The	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis:	  An	  Anatomy	  of	  Global	  Growth,	   IMF	  WORKING	  PAPER	   WP13/76	   (2013),	   available	   at	  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1376.pdf. 	   101.	   	  Id. 	   102.	   	  RICARDO	  FFENCH-­‐DAVIS,	  Reforming	  Macroeconomic	  Policies	   in	  Emerging	  Economies:	   from	  
Procyclical	   to	   Countercyclical	   Approaches,	   THE	   FINANCIAL	   AND	   ECONOMIC	   CRISIS	   OF	   2008-­‐2009	   AND	  DEVELOPING	   COUNTRIES,	   UNITED	   NATIONS	   REPORT,	   256–279	   (2010),	   available	   at	  http://unctad.org/en/Docs/gdsmdp20101_en.pdf.	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  were	  surely	  less	  affected	  by	  the	  global	  decline	  in	  growth	  in	  comparison	  with	  advanced	  economies.103	  Advanced	  economies	  saw	  actual	  declines	  in	   output	   in	   2009	   of	   an	   average	   of	   3.2%.104	   The	   output	   of	   emerging	  economies,	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  grew	  in	  2009,	  albeit	  at	  a	  more	  measured	  pace	   in	   contrast	   to	   previous	   years.	   Their	   output	  moderately	   grew	  on	  average	  2.5%	   in	  2009	   in	   comparison	  with	  6.1%	   in	  2008	  and	  8.3%	   in	  2007.105	  Be	  that	  as	   it	  may,	  MNEs	  patenting	   in	  emerging	  economies	  never-­‐theless	  patent	  overseas	  while	   focusing	  mostly	  on	  profit	  maximization	  internationally.106	  In	  a	  recent	  study	  analyzing	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  location	  of	  headquarters	  on	   investment	  decisions	  of	  approximately	  5,000	  sub-­‐sidiaries	  worldwide,	   the	   authors	   find	   that	   foreign	   ownership	   encour-­‐ages	  a	  focus	  on	  profitability	  when	  taking	  investment	  decisions.107	  The	  	  
 103.  Id.	  (adding	  that	  “This	  was	  mainly	  due	  to	  continued	  growth	  in	  developing	  Asia	  (notably	  China,	  India	  and	  Indonesia),	  but	  also	  growth	  in	  Africa	  that	  compensated	  for	  declines	  elsewhere”).	  
But	  see,	  D.	  M.	  PRATES	  AND	  M.	  A.	  M.	  CINTRA,	  The	  emerging-­‐market	  economies	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  Global	  
financial	  crisis,	  THE	  FINANCIAL	  AND	  ECONOMIC	  CRISIS	  OF	  2008-­‐2009	  AND	  DEVELOPING	  COUNTRIES,	  UNITED	  NATIONS	   REPORT	   54-­‐70	   (2010)	   (“When	   this	   crisis	   spread	   and	   turned	   into	   recession,	   emerging	  economies	  were	  affected,	  mainly	  through	  trade	  channels,	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  these	  indirect	  effects	  in	  many	  countries	  were	  as	  severe	  as	  the	  direct	  effects	  in	  the	  developed	  countries.”),	  avail-­‐
able	  at	  http://unctad.org/en/Docs/gdsmdp20101_en.pdf	  .	  
 104.  Id.	  (explaining	  that	  the	  actual	  declines	  in	  output	  in	  IP	  systems	  in	  Advanced	  economies	  in	  2009	  were	  most	  pronounced	  for	  European	  countries	  (for	  example,	  around	  -­‐5%	  for	  Germany	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom)	  and	  for	  Japan	  (around	  -­‐5%)).	  
 105.  See,	  World	  Intellectual	  Property	  Indicators	  2010,	  supra	  note	  26,	  at	  14.	  
 106.  This	  argument	  makes	  part	  of	  growing	  theoretical	   literature	  on	  the	  internationalization	  of	   MNEs.	   See	   generally,	   Peter	   J.	   Buckley	   and	   Mark	   C.	   Casson,	   The	   internalization	   theory	   of	   the	  
multinational	  enterprise:	  A	  review	  of	  the	  progress	  of	  a	  research	  agenda	  after	  30	  years,	  40	  J.	  INT’L	  BUS	  STUD.	  1563,	  1563	  (2009)	  (providing	  the	  most	  inclusive	  internalization	  theory	  analysis	  across	  30	  years	   focusing	  mainly	  on	   the	  emergence	  and	   functioning	  of	  MNEs);	  Shih-­‐Fen	  S.	  Chen,	  Extending	  
Internalization	  Theory:	  A	  New	  Perspective	  on	  International	  Technology	  Transfer	  and	  its	  Generaliza-­‐
tion,	  36	  J.	   INT’L	  BUS	  STUD.	  231,	  232	  (2005)	  (attempted	  to	  clarify	  the	  continued	  importance	  of	   the	  market.	  It	  extends	  	  internalization	  theory	  by	  adding	  hitherto	  neglected	  market	  	  institutions	  	  to	  the	  	  investment	   	   versus	   licensing	   trade-­‐off	   	   in	   governing	   the	   developer-­‐manufacturer	   	   cooperation:	  arm’s	   length	   	   co-­‐marketing,	   	   contractual	   	   co-­‐marketing,	   and	   	  Original	  equipment	  manufacturers	  (OEM));	   J.	   A.	   Cantwell	   and	   L.	   Piscitello,	   Accumulating	   technological	   competence:	   Its	   changing	  
impact	  on	  corporate	  diversification	  and	   internationalization,	  9	   INDUSTRIAL	  AND	  CORPORATE	  CHANGE	  21,	   21-­‐51	   (2000)	   (identifying	   three	   historical	   phases	   in	   the	   growth	   of	   firms	   in	   terms	   of	   their	  patterns	   of	   diversification	   and	   internationalization).	  Nicholas	   C.	   Georgantzas,	  MNE	  Competitive-­‐
ness:	  A	  Scenario-­‐Driven	  Technology	  Transfer	  Construct,	  12	  MANAGERIAL	  &	  DECISION	  ECON.	  281,	  282-­‐83	  (1991)	  (depicting	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  competition	  between	  MNEs	  operating	  in	  developing	  coun-­‐tries);	   Satya	   Das,	   Externalities,	   and	   technology	   transfer	   through	   multinational	   corporations:	   a	  
theoretical	  analysis,	  22	  J.	  OF	  INT’L	  ECONS.	  171,	  171	  (1987)	  (analyzing	  the	  behavior	  of	  a	  multination-­‐al	   firm’s	   subsidiary	   in	   a	   host	   country	  when	   learning	   of	   its	   production	   techniques	   by	   its	   native	  rivals	  occurs).	  	   107.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  W.	  CARLIN,	  A.	  CHARLTON	  AND	  C.	  MAYER,	  MULTINATIONAL	  OWNERSHIP	  AND	  SUBSIDIARY	  INVESTMENT,	   OXFORD	   FINANCIAL	   RESEARCH	   CENTRE	   ECONOMICS	   SERIES	   32	   (2007),	   available	   at	  http://www.hnb.hr/dub-­‐konf/15-­‐konferencija/paper-­‐carlin-­‐charlton-­‐mayer.pdf	   ;	   Capgemini,	  Latin	   America	   is	   the	   third	   most	   popular	   outsourcing	   destination	   (2010),	   at:	  http://apps.us.capgemini.com/DownloadLibrary/files/factsheets/Capgemini_BPO_LatAmOSdest_fs0610.pdf2;	  Grant	  Thornton	  LLP,	  International	  Sourcing:	  Offshore	  or	  near	  shore?,	  Supply	  Chain	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  MNEs	  barrier	  of	  efficiency	  in	  fact	  is	  even	  more	  powerful	  than	  in	  case	  of	  independent	  firms.108	  This	  is	  all	  the	  more	  visible	  during	  a	  host	  country	  crisis	  when	  MNEs	  often	   times	  withdraw	  capital	   and	   invest	   elsewhere	  more	  easily	  than	  domestic	  firms.109	  2.	  Patent	  Applications	  by	  Office	  Indifference	  Secondly,	   when	   the	   probability	   of	   negative	   change	   of	   the	   patent	  application	  procedure	  counted	  by	  office	   is	   forecasted,	   this	  article’s	   lo-­‐gistic	  models	   provide	   very	   different	   results.	   Counting	   patent	   applica-­‐tions	  by	  office,	  to	  recall,	  account	  for	  fillings	  in	  the	  national	  patent	  office	  by	   all	   applicants.	   This	   procedure	  was	   chosen,	   since	   that	   target	   of	   pa-­‐tenting	   in	   the	   specific	   country	   is	   promoting	   sales	   and	   suppressing	  competitors	  in	  this	  country,	  therefore	  economic	  crisis	  conditions	  in	  the	  country	   targeted	   for	  patenting	  may	  affect	  patenting	  activity	  of	  poten-­‐tial	  applicants,	  independently	  of	  their	  origin.	  The	  dissimilar	  results	  here	  are	  threefold	  referring	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  GDP,	  GNI-­‐PPP	   and	  GERD	  as	   follows.	   To	   begin	  with,	  model	   2.1,	   repre-­‐senting	   GDP	   as	   an	   explanatory	   variable	   is	   the	   only	   significant	   varia-­‐ble.110	   This	   means	   that	   the	   influence	   of	   GDP	   on	   the	   probability	   of	  annual	  decrease	  in	  the	  patent	  applications	  count	  by	  office	  is	  not	  differ-­‐ent	  for	  both	  advanced	  and	  emerging	  economies.	  Accordingly,	   chart	  model	   2.2	   below,	   representing	   GNI-­‐PPP	   as	   an	  explanatory	   variable,	   witnesses	   no	   significance	   in	   influencing	   the	  probability	  of	  the	  patent	  application	  procedure	  by	  office.	  The	  probabil-­‐ity	  declines	   instead	  (with	  p-­‐value	   less	  than	  0.0001).	  More	  specifically,	  the	   influence	   of	   GNI-­‐PPP	   on	   the	   probability	   of	   patent	   application	   by	  office	   is	   not	   significantly	   different	   for	   either	   advanced	   or	   emerging	  economies.	  In	  balance,	   lastly,	  when	  the	  probability	  of	  negative	  change	  of	  the	  patent	  application	  procedure	  by	  office	  is	  forecasted	  using	  GERD,	  model	  2.3	  demonstrates	  significant	  influence	  of	  GERD	  interaction	  with	  country	  type	  (p-­‐value	  0.0002).	  This	  means	  that	  the	  influence	  of	  GERD	  on	   the	  decrease	   in	  patent	   applications	   count	   by	   office	   is	   different	   for	  advanced	  and	  emerging	  economies.	  More	  specifically,	  there	  is	  no	  such	  influence	   for	   emerging	   economies,	   while	   for	   advanced	   economies	  GERD	  influence	  is	  evidenced.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  models	  2.1-­‐2.3	  for	  pa-­‐
	  Solutions,	  1:3	   (2009)	   (adding	   that	   although	   the	  main	   reason	   for	  outsourcing	   is	   identified	  as	   la-­‐bour	  cost	  reduction,	  the	  total	  cost	  of	  outsourcing	  also	  matters	  when	  companies	  make	  a	  decision).	  	   108.	   	  W.	  Carlin,	  A.	  Charlton	  and	  C.	  Mayer,	  supra	  note	  107,	  at	  32.	  	  	   109.	   	  Id.	  
 110.  	  The	  p-­‐value	  function	  of	  the	  observed	  sample	  results	  is	  0.008.	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  tent	   applications	   count	   by	   office	   are	   summarized	   and	   visualized	   also	  on	  Figure	  2.	  In	  conclusion,	  when	  the	  probability	  of	  negative	  change	  of	   the	  pa-­‐tent	  application	  procedure	  by	  office	   is	   forecasted	  the	  overall	   influence	  of	   the	   three	   independent	   variables	   examined	   is	   non	   significant	   and	  thus	   offer	   no	   different	   effect	   on	   emerging	   economies	   in	   comparison	  with	  advanced	  ones.	  Model	  2.1	  Forecasting	  probability	  of	  negative	  annual	  change	  in	  pa-­‐tent	   applications	   count	  by	  office	   v.	   country	   (random	  effect),	  GDP	  and	  their	  interaction	  (fixed	  effects)	  	  
Solutions for Fixed Effects 	  
 
Effect           
 
Category     
 
Estimate        
Standard 
Error        
 




Pr > |t| 
       
Intercept                     -0.2555 0.1790 98.04 -1.43 0.1567 
GDP  -7.0085 2.6372 839.6 -2.66 0.0080 
Category Advanced 0.3535 0.2370 91.14 1.49 0.1392 
GDP*Category Advanced -8.4292 4.3667 839.6 -1.93 0.0539 	   Model	  2.2	  Forecasting	  probability	  of	  negative	  annual	  change	  in	  pa-­‐tent	   applications	   count	   by	   office	   v.	   country	   (random	   effect),	   GNI-­‐PPP	  and	  their	  interaction	  (fixed	  effects)	  	  
Solutions for Fixed Effects 	  
 
Effect           
 
Category     
 
Estimate        
Standard 
Error        
 




Pr > |t| 
       
Intercept                      0.08930 0.2146 174 0.42 0.6779 
GNIPPP  -9.7217 2.3924 826.7 -4.06 <.0001 
Category Advanced 0.1758 0.2820 159.9 0.62 0.5338 
GNIPPP*Category Advanced -1.4321 3.5306 826.2 -0.41 0.6851 	  	  Model	  2.3	  Forecasting	  probability	  of	  negative	  annual	  change	  in	  pa-­‐tent	  applications	  count	  by	  office	  v.	  country	  (random	  effect),	  GERD	  and	  their	  interaction	  (fixed	  effects)	  
Solutions for Fixed Effects 	  











Effect           
 
Category     
 
Estimate        
Standard 
Error        
 




Pr > |t| 
       
Intercept                     -0.5571 0.1844 39.98 -3.02 0.0044 
GERD  -0.1280 0.4618 553.5 -0.28 0.7817 
Category Advanced 0.6448 0.2437 43.7 2.65 0.0113 
GERD*Category Advanced -7.2895 1.9604 569 -3.72 0.0002 	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Fig.	  2	  Probability	  of	  negative	  annual	  change	  in	  patent	  applications	  by	  office	   count	   (vertical	   axis)	   v.	   annual	   change	   in	   economic	  variables	  (horizontal	  axis)	  When	  patent	  applications	  count	  by	  office	  is	  taken	  as	  a	  dependent	  variable,	   the	   picture	   is	   significantly	   different.	   In	   such	   case,	   for	   GDP	  itself	  influence	  (Model	  2.1)	  was	  found	  significant.111	  A	  similar	  observa-­‐tions	  were	  found	  for	  the	  GNI-­‐PPP	  economic	  variable	  (Model	  2.2).112	  In	  both	  cases	   the	  effect	   is	  negative,	  but	   for	  GNI-­‐PPP	   its	  absolute	  value	   is	  much	  lower	  than	  for	  GDP.	  GERD,	  oppositely,	  shows	  rather	  strong,	  neg-­‐ative	   and	   significant	   interaction	   effect	   (Model	   2.3),	   while	   pure	   GERD	  effect	  is	  insignificant.	  Fig.	  2	  summarizes	  and	  visualizes	  these	  effects.	  It	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  the	  difference	  between	  advanced	  and	  emerging	  econ-­‐omies	  for	  GDP	  as	  an	  economic	  variable	  is	  much	  less	  pronounced	  than	  in	   the	   case	   of	   patent	   applications	   by	   origin	   as	   a	   dependent	   variable	  (Fig.1),	   for	  GNI-­‐PPP	   this	  difference	   is	  negligible,	   and	   for	  GERD,	   again,	  patenting	   activity	   in	   emerging	   economies	   is	   totally	   insensitive	   to	  	  
 111.  The	  interaction	  was	  not	  significant	  as	  the	  p-­‐value	  was	  found	  to	  be	  above	  0.05.	  
 112.  In	   this	   case	   interaction	   shows	   p-­‐value	   as	   high	   as	   0.6851,	   indicating	   negligible	   signifi-­‐cance.	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  changes	   in	   this	  variable.	  The	   fact	   that	  by	  office	  patent	  applications	  do	  not	   account	   for	   the	   separate	   contribution	   of	   MNEs	   operating	   from	  overseas,	  may	  explain	  these	  dissimilar	  results	   in	  comparison	  with	  the	  previous	  by	  origin	  patent	  application	  count.	  3.	  Non-­‐Resident	  Patent	  Applications	  Insignificance	  So	   far	  we	   have	   examined	   two	   of	   three	   patent	   application	   proce-­‐dures,	  namely	  by	  origin	  and	  by	  office.	  A	  third	  patent	  application	  proce-­‐dure	  follows.	  It	  is	  as	  said	  the	  application	  procedure	  by	  non-­‐resident.	  Such	  patent	  procedure	  to	  recall	  counts	  patent	  applications	  filed	  in	  the	  national	  patent	  office,	  but	  only	  those	  filed	  by	  foreigners.	  This	  pro-­‐cedure	  was	  chosen,	  since	  country	  residents	  are	  more	  prone	  to	  file	  ap-­‐plications	  in	  local	  patent	  office	  than	  abroad.	  When	   the	   probability	   of	   the	   negative	   change	   in	  non-­‐resident	   pa-­‐tent	   applications	   is	   forecasted,	   the	   overall	   non	   significant	   results	   are	  similar	   to	   those	   for	  patent	  applications	  by	  office.	  Model	  3.1,	  similar	   to	  model	  2.1	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  only	  significant	  explanatory	  economic	  variable	  is	  GDP	  (p-­‐value	  0.0078).	  The	  influence	  of	  GDP	  on	  the	  probabil-­‐ity	   of	   annual	   decrease	   in	  non-­‐resident	   patent	   applications	   is	   thus	   not	  different	  for	  advanced	  and	  emerging	  economies.	  Also	  model	  3.2	  shows	  similar	  influence	  of	  GNI-­‐PPP	  on	  the	  probability	  of	  the	  negative	  annual	  change	   in	   non-­‐residents	   application	   for	   both	   types	   of	   country	   groups	  (p-­‐value	  in	  this	  case	  is	  0.0063).	  As	  for	  the	  influence	  of	  GERD,	  model	  3.3	  demonstrates	  no	  influence	  of	  this	  explanatory	  variable	  on	  the	  probabil-­‐ity	   of	   negative	   change	   in	   non-­‐resident	   patent	   applications	   for	   both	  types	  of	  country	  groups.	  The	  probability	  of	   the	  patent	  count	  decrease	  in	   this	   case	   is	   in	   the	   range	  40-­‐50%,	  as	   can	  be	   seen	   in	  almost	  parallel	  lines	  in	  Figure	  3	  below.	  Model	   3.1	   Forecasting	   probability	   of	   negative	   annual	   change	   in	  non-­‐resident	  patent	  applications	  count	  v.	  country	  (random	  effect),	  GDP	  and	  their	  interaction	  (fixed	  effects)	  
Solutions for Fixed Effects 	  
 
Effect           
 
Category     
 
Estimate        
Standard 
Error        
 




Pr > |t| 
       
Intercept                     0.02330 0.1769 117.6 0.13 0.8954 
GDP  -7.1249 2.6710 822.3 -2.67 0.0078 
Category Advanced 0.2178 0.2329 105.3 0.94 0.3518 
GDP*Category Advanced -0.7927 4.1867 821.8 -0.19 0.8499 	   	  







-­‐0.5	   -­‐0.3	   -­‐0.1	   0.1	   0.3	   0.5	  
gdp-­‐emerging	  
	   Model	   3.2	   Forecasting	   probability	   of	   negative	   annual	   change	   in	  non-­‐resident	   patent	   applications	   count	   v.	   country	   (random	   effect),	  GNI-­‐PPP	  and	  their	  interaction	  (fixed	  effects)	  	  	  
Solutions for Fixed Effects 	  
 
Effect           
 
Category     
 
Estimate        
Standard 
Error        
 




Pr > |t| 
       
Intercept                      0.1074 0.2046 182.1  0.52 0.6003 
GNIPPP  -6.0444 2.2067 816.9 -2.74 0.0063 
Category Advanced  0.2882 0.2724 170.7  1.06 0.2916 
GNIPPP*Categor
y 
Advanced -1.0752 3.3108 815.1 -0.32 0.7455 	   Model	   3.3	   Forecasting	   probability	   of	   negative	   annual	   change	   in	  non-­‐resident	   patent	   applications	   count	   v.	   country	   (random	   effect),	  GERD	  and	  their	  interaction	  (fixed	  effects)	  	  
Solutions for Fixed Effects 	  
 
Effect           
 
Category     
 
Estimate        
Standard 
Error        
 




Pr > |t| 
       
Intercept                     -0.2610 0.1993 38.2 -1.31 0.1981 
GERD  -0.1661 0.4484 533.9 -0.37 0.7113 
Category Advanced 0.3937 0.2642 40.96 1.49 0.1439 
GERD*Category Advanced -0.1020 1.6980 553.1 -0.06 0.9521 
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  Fig.	  3	  Probability	  of	  negative	  annual	  change	  in	  non-­‐resident	  patent	  applications	  count	   (vertical	   axis)	  v.	   annual	   change	   in	  economic	  varia-­‐bles	  (horizontal	  axis)	  Finally,	   when	   the	   non-­‐resident	   patent	   applications	   count	   is	   con-­‐sidered	   as	   a	   dependent	   value,	   two	   of	   the	   economic	   variables	   were	  found	  significant	  separately	  (GDP	   in	  Model	  3.1	  and	  GNI-­‐PPP	   in	  Model	  3.2),	   while	   their	   combinations	  with	   country	   category	  were	   found	   es-­‐sentially	  insignificant.	  As	  for	  GERD	  influence,	  Model	  3.3	  demonstrated	  insignificance	  of	  all	   the	   independent	  variables	   included.	  No	  difference	  between	   advanced	   and	   emerging	   economies	   in	   influence	   of	   separate	  economic	   variables	   on	   this	   kind	   of	   patenting	   activities	   has	   been	   ob-­‐served,	  as	  Fig.	  3	  illustrates.	  4.	  Verification	  of	  Irregularities	  for	  Crisis	  Years	  2001,	  2008	  Three	  additional	  models	  labeled	  as	  models	  1.1Y	  -­‐	  1.3Y	  were	  fitted	  referring	  to	  the	  global	  crisis	  years	  of	  2001	  and	  2008	  as	  a	  fixed	  factor.	  The	  former,	  also	  known	  as	  “Early	  2000s	  Recession”,	  affected	  the	  Euro-­‐pean	  Union,	   the	  United	  States,	  Turkey,	  Argentina	  and	  other	   countries	  and	  was	  triggered	  by	  the	  “Dot-­‐com	  Bubble”	  collapse	   in	  2000.	  This	  re-­‐cession	  was	   relatively	   short	   and	  mild.113	  Alternatively,	   the	   latter	   eco-­‐nomic	   crisis	   caused	   the	   2008	   recession,	   triggered	   by	   housing	   bubble	  collapse	   in	   the	   USA,	   was	   spread	   worldwide	   and	   hit	   many	   countries	  with	   different	   degree	   of	   severity.114	   The	   purpose	   of	   this	   section	   is	   to	  corroborate	  this	  article’s	  findings	  with	  data	  concerning	  the	  two	  global	  crises	  years	  which	  fell	  within	  the	  article’s	  annual	  time	  series	  of	  1997-­‐2012.	   The	   three	  models	   herein	   are	   complementary	   to	   the	   three	   eco-­‐nomic	  variables	  described	  above,	  namely	  GDP,	  GNI-­‐PPP	  and	  GERD.	  As	  models	  1.1Y-­‐	  1.3Y	  forecast	  below,	  the	  annual	  negative	  change	  in	  patent	  applications	  count	  by	  origin,	  in	  all	  three	  cases	  demonstrate	  significance	  
	  
 113.  The	  2001	  recession	  is	  regarded	  short	  and	  mild	  on	  average	  in	  comparison	  to	  other	  post-­‐World	  War	  II	  recessions.	  See,	  Kevin	  L.	  Kliesen,	  The	  2001	  Recession:	  How	  Was	  It	  Different	  and	  What	  
Developments	  May	  Have	  Caused	  It?,	  THE	  FEDERAL	  RESERVE	  BANK	  OF	  ST.	  LOUIS	  23	  (2003),	  available	  at	  https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/03/09/Kliesen.pdf.	  	  
 114.  The	  crisis	  started	  in	  the	  United	  States	  as	  of	  2007.	  It	  later	  spread	  to	  numerous	  financial	  institutions	   in	   other	   OECD	   countries.	   Only	   when	   it	   became	   a	   global	   economic	   recession	   that	  developing	   and	   emerging-­‐market	   economies	   were	   affected.	   	   See,	   SEBASTIAN	   DULLIEN,	   DETLEF	   J.	  KOTTE,	   ALEJANDRO	   MÁRQUEZ	   AND	   JAN	   PRIEWE,	   FINANCIAL	   AND	   ECONOMIC	   CRISIS	   OF	   2008-­‐2009	   AND	  DEVELOPING	   COUNTRIES,	   UNITED	   NATIONS	   REPORT	   1	   (2010),	   available	   at	  http://unctad.org/en/Docs/gdsmdp20101_en.pdf.	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  of	   year	  and	   interactions	  over	  patenting	  application	  procedures	   in	   the	  two	  country	  groups	  (p-­‐values	  less	  than	  0.05).115	  In	  analogy,	  as	  models	  1.1-­‐1.3	  above	  have	  demonstrated,	  there	  is	  a	  significant	  influence	  of	  each	  economic	  variable	  reviewed	  on	  the	  proba-­‐bility	  of	  negative	  change	  in	  patent	  applications	  count	  by	  origin.	  That	  is,	  as	   this	   influence	   is	  much	  milder	   for	  emerging	  economies	   than	   for	  ad-­‐vanced	  ones	  per	  the	  two	  crisis	  years	  reviewed.	  In	  any	  case,	  decrease	  in	  the	  value	  of	   the	  economic	  variables	   significantly	   increases	   the	  proba-­‐bility	   of	   negative	   change	   in	   patent	   applications	   count	   by	   origin,	   and.	  Thus,	  if	  Figure	  1	  above	  represent	  general	  dependence	  of	  said	  probabil-­‐ity	   on	   the	   annual	   change	   in	   economic	   variables,	   positive	   or	   negative,	  Figures	   4-­‐6	   below	   demonstrate	   such	   dependence	   for	   specific	   years	  with	  predominantly	  negative	  change	  in	  economic	  factors	  for	  most	  ad-­‐vanced	   economies.	   It	   further	   shows	   significant	   slowdown	   for	   most	  emerging	   economies.	   It	   can	   be	   seen	   that	   the	   difference	   between	   ad-­‐vanced	   and	   emerging	   economies	   is	   much	   more	   pronounced	   for	   the	  crises	  wrecked	  years	  of	  2001	  and	  2008	  in	  comparison	  with	  the	  overall	  patent	  application	  by	  origin	  examination	  per	  Figure	  1	  above,	  as	  follows.	  Model	   1.1Y	   Forecasting	   probability	   of	   negative	   change	   in	   patent	   applica-­‐tions	  count	  by	  origin	  by	  means	  of	  the	  following	  explanatory	  variables:	  country	  (random	  effect),	  GDP,	   category	   and	   their	   interaction	   (fixed	  effects)	   and	  year	  (fixed	  factor)	  	  




Year     
 
Estimate        
Standard 
Error        
 




Pr > |t| 
        
Intercept                      -0.3116 0.3306 527.8 -0.94 0.3464 
GDP   -1.2902 3.0350 822.5 -0.43 0.6709 
Category Advanced  0.04762 0.2500 85.51  0.19 0.8494 
GDP* 
Category 
Advanced  -20.3347 5.1092 829 -43.98 <.0001 
Year  1997 0.02819 0.4137 780 0.07 0.9457 
Year  1998 -1.3148 0.4811 779.2 -2.73 0.0064 
Year  1999 0.09868 0.4101 779 0.24 0.8099 
Year  2000 -0.8407 0.4708 781.2 -1.79 0.0745 
Year  2001 -0.1324 0.4045 775.7 -0.33 0.7436 
Year  2002 0.05813 0.4007 776.6 0.15 0.8847 	  
 115.  Since	  interactions	  have	  been	  found	  significant,	   the	  influence	  of	  the	  main	  effects	  can	  be	  explained	  via	   these	   interactions	   as	   represented	  on	  Figures	  4-­‐6	  below	   for	   years	  2001	  and	  2008	  only.	  That	  is	  since	  the	  representation	  of	  the	  year	  as	  an	  additional	  variable	  will	  complicate	  visuali-­‐zation.	  







-­‐0.4	   -­‐0.3	   -­‐0.2	   -­‐0.1	   0	   0.1	   0.2	  emerging-­‐2001	   advanced-­‐2001	  
 	
Year  2003 -0.3688 0.4167 778.1 -0.88 0.3765 
Year  2004 -1.0255 0.4834 782.6 -2.12 0.0342 
Year  2005 -0.6869 0.4463 781.7 -1.54 0.1242 
Year  2006 -0.6019 0.4525 784.6 -1.33 0.1839 
Year  2007 -0.7201 0.4611 784.8 -1.56 0.1187 
Year  2008 -0.4412 0.4090 774.9 -1.08 0.2809 




Year     
 
Estimate        
Standard 
Error        
 




Pr > |t| 
        
Year  2010 -1.1987 0.4759 778.4 -2.52 0.0120 
Year  2011 -0.07861 0.4033 776.2 -0.19 0.8455 	  










Pr > F 
     
GDP 1 815 14.27 0.0002 
Category 1 85.51 0.04 0.8494 
GDP*Category 1 829 15.84 <.0001 
Year 15 779.4 2.06 0.0102 	  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Fig.4	   Probability	   of	   negative	   change	   in	   patent	   applications	   count	   by	  origin	  (vertical	  axis)	  v.	  annual	  changes	  in	  GDP	  (horizontal	  axis)	  	  









Year     
 
Estimate        
Standard 
Error        
 




Pr > |t| 
        
Intercept                      -0.03142 0.3466 559.5 0.09 0.9278 
GNIPP   -3.9551 2.6293 822.5 -1.50 0.1329 
Category Advanced  0.01618 0.2882 164  0.06 0.9553 
GNIPPP* 
Category 
Advanced  -9.7950 3.9628 815.5 -2.47 0.0136 
Year  1997 -0.1822 0.4050 772.5 -0.45 0.6529 
Year  1998 -1.5509 0.4765 774.8 -3.25 0.0012 
Year  1999 -0.2354 0.4024 771.7 -0.58 0.5588 
Year  2000 -0.9705 0.4655 775.6 -2.08 0.0374 
Year  2001 -0.2600 0.4015 771.6 -0.65 0.5174 
Year  2002 -0.1090 0.3972 771.2 -0.27 0.7839 
Year  2003 -0.5859 0.4120 772.2 -1.42 0.1554 
Year  2004 -1.1722 0.4760 774.8 -2.46 0.0140 
Year  2005 -0.8259 0.4409 775.6 -1.87 0.0615 
Year  2006 -0.5488 0.4579 782.2 -1.20 0.2311 
Year  2007 -0.9896 0.4630 774.4 -2.14 0.0329 
Year  2008 -0.5120 0.4130 771.3 -1.24 0.2154 
Year  2009 0.2706 0.4145 777.3 0.65 0.5141 
Year  2010 -1.4293 0.4724 772.8 -3.03 0.0026 
Year  2011 -0.1259 0.4014 770.8 -0.31 0.7538 	  	  










Pr > F 
     







-­‐0.5	   -­‐0.3	   -­‐0.1	   0.1	   0.3	   0.5	  emerging-­‐2001	   advanced-­‐2001	  
GNIPPP 1 823 14.49 0.0002 
Category 1 164 0.00 0.9553 
GNIPP*Category 1 815.5 6.11 0.0136 
Year 15 774 2.43 0.0018 	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Fig.	   5	   Probability	   of	   negative	   change	   in	   patent	   applications	   count	   by	  origin	  (vertical	  axis)	  v.	  annual	  changes	  in	  GNI-­‐PPP	  (horizontal	  axis)	  	  Model	   1.3Y	   Forecasting	   probability	   of	   negative	   change	   in	   patent	   applica-­‐tions	  count	  by	  origin	  by	  means	  of	  the	  following	  explanatory	  variables:	  country	  (random	  effect),	  GERD,	  category	  and	  their	  interaction	  (fixed	  effects)	  and	  year	  (fixed	  factor)	  




Year     
 
Estimate        
Standard 
Error        
 




Pr > |t| 
        
Intercept                      -0.5513 0.4069 367.8 -1.35 0.1763 
GERD   0.06267 0.4914 547.9 0.13 0.8985 
Category Advanced  -0.1391 0.2579 38.9  -0.54 0.5926 
GERD* 
Category 
Advanced  -4.5098 2.1313 557 -2.12 0.0348 







-­‐1	   -­‐0.5	   0	   0.5	   1	  
emerging-­‐2001	   advanced-­‐2001	  
Year  1997 0.04680 0.5074 523.8 0.09 0.9265 
Year  1998 -1.2248 0.5984 522.7 -2.05 0.0412 
Year  1999 -0.02881 0.5049 523.8 -0.06 0.9545 
Year  2000 -0.9000 0.5739 523.8 -1.57 0.1174 
Year  2001 0.01533 0.4961 523.1 0.03 0.9754 
Year  2002 0.3544 0.4831 524.1 0.73 0.4636 
Year  2003 -0.06289 0.4949 523.3 -0.13 0.8989 




Year     
 
Estimate        
Standard 
Error        
 




Pr > |t| 
        
Year  2005 -0.5106 0.5228 522.3 -0.98 0.3291 
Year  2006 -0.6515 0.5353 522.5 -1.22 0.2241 
Year  2007 -1.1973 0.5955 520.2 -2.01 0.0449 
Year  2008 -0.2801 0.5169 521.2 -0.54 0.5582 
Year  2009 1.1554 0.4983 523.5 2.32 0.0208 
Year  2010 -0.7985 0.5506 520 -1.45 0.1476 
Intercept                      -0.5513 0.4069 367.8 -1.35 0.1763 
 










Pr > F 
     
GERD 1 557 4.11 0.0430 
Category 1 38.9 0.29 0.5926 
Gerd*Category 1 557 4.48 0.0348 
Year 14 519.6 2.97 0.0002 	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  Fig.	   6	   Probability	   of	   negative	   change	   in	   patent	   applications	   count	   by	  origin	  (vertical	  axis)	  v.	  annual	  changes	  in	  GERD	  (horizontal	  axis)	  Additional	  Models	  1.1Y-­‐1.3Y	  were	  applied	  to	  check	  the	  relevance	  of	   the	  above	  mentioned	   findings	   for	  years	  of	  global	  or,	  at	   least,	  wide-­‐spread	  economic	  crisis.	  Two	  years—2001	  and	  2008	  were	  chosen,	   the	  former	   is	   associated	  with	   so-­‐called	   “Early	  2000-­‐s	  Recession”,	   and	   the	  latter	  with	  the	  global	  recession	  following	  the	  2007	  financial	  crisis.	  The	  three	   models	   include	   one	   dependent	   variable—patent	   applications	  count	  by	  origin,	  and	  independent	  variables	  according	  to	  Models	  1.1—1.3	  respectively.	  They	   include	  also	  years	  as	  a	   fixed	   factor.	  The	  results	  for	  Model	   1.1Y,	   including	  GDP	   as	   an	   economic	   variable,	   show	   signifi-­‐cance	  of	  GDP,	  its	  interaction	  with	  country	  category,	  and	  of	  year.	  This	  is	  different	  from	  Model	  1.1,	  in	  which	  only	  the	  interaction	  significance	  was	  established.	  Fig.4	  shows	  a	  strong	  influence	  of	  GDP	  change	  on	  the	  probability	  of	  negative	   change	   in	   patent	   applications	   count	   by	   origin	   for	   advanced	  economies,	  whereas	  for	  emerging	  economies	  an	  essential	   indifference	  could	  be	  observed.	  Similar	  picture	  can	  be	  observed	  on	  Fig.	  5	  for	  Model	  1.2Y,	   which	   includes	   GNI-­‐PPP	   as	   an	   economic	   explanatory	   variable.	  Also	  in	  this	  case	  economic	  variable,	  its	  interaction	  with	  country	  catego-­‐ry,	  and	  year	  were	  found	  significant.	  One	  can	  see	  the	  noticeable	  differ-­‐ence	  in	  advanced	  and	  emerging	  economies	  patenting	  activity	  behavior:	  the	   latter	   demonstrates	   essential	   indifference	   to	   economic	   variable	  changes	   even	   in	   the	   crisis	   years.	   Fig.	   6	   illustrates	   the	   results	   of	   the	  Model	  1.3Y,	  including	  GERD	  as	  an	  explanatory	  economic	  variable.	  Also	  in	   this	   case	   the	   difference	   between	   advanced	   economies	   (strong	   de-­‐pendence	  of	  patenting	  activity	  on	  GERD	  changes)	  and	  emerging	  econ-­‐omies	   (essential	   indifference	   of	   patenting	   activity	   to	   GERD	   changes)	  could	  be	  observed.	  These	  observations	  show	   first	   that	   the	  response	  of	   the	  patenting	  activity	   to	   change	   in	   the	   economic	   variables	   is	   year	   sensitive.	   These	  observations	  further	  shows	  that	  the	  type	  of	  this	  response,	  different	  for	  advanced	  and	  emerging	  economies,	  is	  essentially	  the	  same	  for	  diverse	  and	   concrete	   crisis	   years.	   Models	   1.1-­‐1.3	   describe	   patenting	   activity	  response	   to	   economic	   development	   along	   the	   years,	   when	   annual	  changes	  of	  economic	  variables	  for	  different	  countries	  could	  be	  positive	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  or	   negative,	   according	   to	   the	   business	   cycle	   phase.	  However,	   for	   two	  chosen	  years,	  included	  in	  Models	  1.1Y-­‐1.3Y,	  changes	  of	  economic	  vari-­‐ables	  were	  strongly	  biased	  to	  negative	  values	  for	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  coun-­‐tries,	   due	   to	   the	   spread	   of	   the	   economic	   crisis.	   The	   obtained	   results	  show	  that,	  even	   in	   this	  case,	   the	  probability	  of	  negative	  change	   in	  pa-­‐tent	   applications	   count	   by	   origin	   for	   emerging	   economies	   remained	  much	  less	  sensitive	  to	  economic	  development.	  The	  results	  described	  above	  should	  not	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  lack	  of	  response	  of	  the	  patenting	  activity	  to	  economic	  developments,	  and,	  spe-­‐cifically,	   to	   economic	   crises	   for	   emerging	   economies.	   They	   solely	  demonstrate	   that	   the	   real	   decrease	   in	   patent	   applications	   count	   by	  origin	   is	   much	   less	   probable	   for	   emerging	   economies	   than	   for	   ad-­‐vanced	   ones	   altogether.	   Notwithstanding	   these	   findings,	   a	   certain	  slowdown	  in	  the	  rate	  of	  annual	  change	  of	  patent	  applications	  count	  by	  origin	   (yet	   remaining	  positive)	  has	  been	  observed	   for	  most	  emerging	  economies	   in	   2008-­‐2009.	   These	   findings	  may	  help	   finding	  policies	   to	  protect	   innovation	  or	   at	   least	  patenting	   filling	   activity	   from	   the	   influ-­‐ence	  of	   business	   cycle	   downturns,	   recessions	   and	  other	   crisis	   effects.	  The	  reasons	  being	  it,	  that	  successful	  innovation	  and	  more	  so	  patenting	  activity	  could	  possibly	  be	  perceived	  a	  key	  factor	  for	  recovery	  from	  cri-­‐ses	  while	  overcoming	  their	  negative	  consequences.	  
D.	  Conclusions	  The	  analysis	  of	  all	  nine	  models	  described	  shows	  how	  different	  pa-­‐tenting	   filing	  procedures	  separately	  convert	  as	  economic	  crisis	  condi-­‐tions	  come	  about.	  GDP	  changes	  affect	  all	  of	  the	  three	  analyzed	  types	  of	  patenting	   activities.	   That	   is	   so,	   as	   economic	   crisis	   conditions	   signifi-­‐cantly	   increase	   the	   probability	   of	   negative	   change	   in	   patent	   applica-­‐tions	  count	  with	  decrease	  in	  economic	  variable	  value.	  What	  is	  more	  is	  that	   crisis	   conditions	   influence	   patenting	   activity	   in	   advanced	   and	  emerging	   economies	   distinctively.	   For	   patent	   applications	   by	   origin	  where	  MNEs	   take	  central	   stage	   this	  difference	   is	  very	  pronounced.	   In	  such	   case,	   annual	   negative	   change	   in	   GDP	   in	   advanced	   economies	   is	  followed	  by	  negative	  change	  in	  the	  count	  of	  patent	  applications,	  origi-­‐nated	   from	   the	   same	   country,	   with	   high	   probability.	   Then	   again,	   in	  emerging	  economies	  patent	  applications	  by	  origin	  are	  essentially	  indif-­‐ferent	   to	   changes	   of	   GDP.	   This	  may	   indicate	   that	   in	   emerging	   econo-­‐mies,	   where	   innovation	   is	   predominantly	   promoted	   by	  multinational	  corporations	  and	  FDI	  as	  said,	  patenting	  activity-­‐related	  decisions	  come	  from	  outside	  the	  country.	  In	  such	  cases	  patenting	  is	  substantively	  less	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  of	   reactive	   to	   economic	   developments	   within	   emerging	   economies	  themselves.	  Furthermore,	   when	   the	   count	   of	   patent	   applications	   by	   office	   is	  considered	   as	   a	   dependent	   variable,	   the	   difference	   in	   its	   response	   to	  economic	  changes	   is	  much	   less	  pronounced	   for	  advanced	  and	  emerg-­‐ing	   economies.	   This	   count	   includes	   either	   domestic	   or	   foreign	   patent	  applications.	   Foreign	   patenting	   is	   aimed	   predominantly	   to	   increase	  market	  shares	  and	  suppress	  competitors,	  while	  the	  motives	  for	  domes-­‐tic	  patenting	   could	  be	  different,	   such	  as	  primary	   filing	   for	  priority.	   In	  this	  case	  a	  much	  closer	  behavior	  of	  patenting	  activity	  in	  advanced	  and	  emerging	  economies	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  annual	  changes	  of	  GDP	  is	  observed.	  Turning	   to	   the	   non-­‐resident	   patent	   applications	   count	   as	   a	   de-­‐pendent	  variable,	  one	  can	  observe	  an	  almost	  identical	  behavior	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  patenting	  activity	   in	   advanced	  and	  emerging	  economies.	  That	  is,	   with	   regard	   to	   annual	   changes	   in	   GDP.	   Since	   non-­‐resident	   patent	  applications	  represent	  foreign	  patenting	  in	  the	  country’s	  Patent	  Office,	  it	  may	  mean	   that	   the	   response	  of	   foreign	  patent	  applications	   filing	   to	  the	  domestic	  economic	  development	   is	  similar	   for	  different	  groups	  of	  countries.	  So	  much	  so,	  at	  least	  for	  emerging	  and	  advanced	  economies.	  This	   makes	   sense	   in	   the	   assumption	   that	   advanced	   and	   emerging	  economies	   constitute	   important	   markets	   for	   innovative	   technologies	  and	   products.	   They	   similarly	   offer	   a	   mix	   of	   players	   present	   in	   non-­‐resident	   patent	   applications	   filing	   activity	   in	   each	   country,	   excluding	  domestic	   applicants.	   These	   domestic	   applicants	  may	  make	   difference	  between	  applications	  by	  office	  and	  non-­‐resident	  applications	  behavior.	  Switching	  to	  GNI-­‐PPP	  as	  an	  independent	  economic	  variable,	  simi-­‐lar	  behavior	  of	  three	  types	  of	  patent	  applications	  counts	  are	  observed.	  The	  effect	  here	   is	  nevertheless	   significantly	   less	  pronounced.	  The	  dif-­‐ference	  between	  GDP	  and	  GNI-­‐PPP	  is	  in	  that	  the	  former	  measures	  do-­‐mestic	   economic	   output,	   including	   gross	   values	   added	   by	   foreign	  producers	   functioning	   in	   the	   country,	   and	   excluding	   those	   added	   by	  residents	  functioning	  outside	  the	  country.	  The	  latter	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  measures	   gross	   national	   income,	   including	   domestic	   and	   foreign	   out-­‐put	  claimed	  by	  residents,	  but	  excluding	  that	  of	  foreign	  producers	  func-­‐tioning	  within	  the	  country.	  These	  foreign	  producers,	  originating	  mainly	  from	  advanced	  economies,	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  lion’s	  share	  of	  inno-­‐vation	  and	  R&D	  thereof	   in	  emerging	  countries.	  Residents	  of	  emerging	  economies	  presiding	  overseas	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  thus	  seem	  much	  less	  influential	  for	  patenting	  and	  possibly	  innovative	  activity	  in	  these	  coun-­‐tries.	  Conversely,	  residents	  of	  advanced	  economies	  presiding	  overseas	  are	  substantively	  more	  influential.	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   analysis	   observed	   differently	  when	   GERD	  was	   chosen	   as	   an	  explanatory	   independent	  economic	  variable.	  For	  emerging	  economies	  in	  this	  case	  a	  totally	  indifferent	  behavior	  of	  all	  three	  kinds	  of	  patenting	  activities	  to	  annual	  change	  of	  GERD	  was	  established.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  non-­‐resident	  applications	  such	  indifference	  was	  observed	  also	  for	  advanced	  economies.	   For	   patent	   application	   counts	   by	   origin	   and	   by	   office	   the	  difference	   in	   patenting	   activity	   behavior	   between	   advanced	   and	  emerging	  economies	  in	  response	  to	  GERD	  changes	  could	  be	  explained	  similarly	   to	   the	   above	   explanation	   of	   GNI-­‐PPP	   influence.	   It	   could	   be	  expected	  that	  innovation	  activity	  in	  emerging	  countries,	  predominant-­‐ly	  led	  by	  foreign	  and	  multinational	  corporations	  would	  not	  depend	  on	  changes	  of	  domestic	  GERD	  that	  is	  predominantly	  financed	  by	  the	  pub-­‐lic	   sector.	   That	   should	   not	   be	   the	   case	   in	   the	   advanced	   economies,	  where	  significant	   influence	  of	  business	  R&D	  investments	  on	  domestic	  patenting	  activity	  could	  be	  expected.	  As	   for	   non-­‐resident	   patent	   applications	   count,	   this	   variable	   pre-­‐sents	  merely	  foreign	  patenting	  activity	  that	  naturally	  is	  not	  expected	  to	  depend	   on	   the	   domestic	   R&D	   expenditures.	   Therefore	   total	   indiffer-­‐ence	  could	  be	  observed	  for	  both	  advanced	  and	  emerging	  economies.	  III.	  THEORETICAL	  RAMIFICATIONS	  Extreme	  disruption	  of	   financial	  and	  monetary	  systems	  seemingly	  affects	   patenting	   activity.	   Labeled	   as	   economic	   crises,	   they	   do	   so	  whether	   patenting	   activity	   is	   measured	   by	   patent	   application	   rates	  proxied	  by	  origin,	  by	  office	  or	  by	  non-­‐residents.	  That	  said,	  four	  conceptual	  and	  methodological	  constraints	  still	  en-­‐tail	   further	   research.	  To	  start	  with,	   given	   the	   loose	  causality	  between	  patenting	  application	  rates	  and	  innovation-­‐based	  growth,	  also	  the	  con-­‐nection	  between	  economic	  crises	  on	  innovation-­‐based	  growth	  remains	  unsettled.	  Up	  to	  now,	  no	  linear	  connection	  linking	  R&D	  expenditure	  as	  proxy	   of	   innovation	   and	  patent	   filing	   activity	   has	   been	   accurately	   es-­‐tablished.116	   This	   relation	   necessitates	   further	   analysis.	   That	   is	   not-­‐withstanding	  empirical	  evidence	  showing	  that	  R&D	  as	  a	  chief	  proxy	  of	  innovation	   is	   predominantly	   pro-­‐cyclical,	   concentrated	   in	   the	   boom	  phases	  of	  business	  cycles	  and	  thinned	  out	  in	  crises.117	  At	   first	   sight,	   one	   could	   draw	   parallel	   between	   R&D	   propensity	  rates	  and	  patent	   filling	   rated	  by	  origin,	   across	   the	  north-­‐south	  divide.	  	  
 116.  See,	  World	  Intellectual	  Property	  Indicators	  2010,	  supra	  note	  26,	  at	  21.	  	   117.	   	  G.	  Barlevy,	  On	  the	  Cyclicality	  of	  Research	  and	  Development,	  97	  AMERICAN	  ECONOMIC	  REVIEW	  1131,	  1131–1164	  (2007). 
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  The	  impact	  of	  the	  2008	  economic	  crisis	   indeed	  indicates	  such	  compa-­‐rable	   gap	   herein.	   Estimates	   by	   the	   2009	   Battelle	   and	   R&D	  Magazine	  suggests	  in	  fact	  that	  per	  total	  world	  R&D	  investments	  for	  2009	  would	  of	  almost	  1%	   lower	   than	   in	  2008,	  an	  overall	   figure	  masks	  substantial	  differences	  amid	  countries.	  A	  notable	  3.7%	  increase	   in	  R&D	  spending	  in	  2009	  was	  perceived	  per	  Asia.	  China	  most	  notably	  increased	  by	  20%	  and	   India	   by	   an	   increasing	   rate	   of	   5%.	   The	   United	   States	   and	   other	  Americas	   economies,	   Japan	   and	  Europe	   on	   the	   other	   hand	  were	   esti-­‐mated	  to	  drop	  by	  more	  than	  2%,	  5.5%	  and	  4%,	  respectively.118	  Similar	  findings	  are	  found	  for	  Europe.	  A	  2009	  cross-­‐country	  survey	  of	  Europe-­‐an	   firms,	   finds	   that	   in	   response	   to	   the	   2008	   global	   economic	   crisis	  firms	  were	   two	   to	   three	   times	  more	   likely	   to	   save	  on	   innovation	  cost	  spending.119	   Overall,	   evidence	   from	   2009	   seems	   to	   confirm	   that	   the	  2008	   crisis	   and	   economic	   downturn	   have	   had	   a	   chilling	   effect	   over	  firms’	   expenditures	   on	   innovation,	   similar	   to	   the	   one	  witnessed	  with	  patent	  filling	  rates	  as	  said.	  Yet,	  not	  all	  R&D	  activity	  connotes	  patenting	  prosecution	  or	  patent	  filling.120	  WIPO’s	  2010	   Indicators	   report	   confirms	   that	  per	   a	   series	  of	  top	  100	  PCT	  applicants	  and	  their	  R&D	  expenditure	  finds	  a	  positive	  and	  considerable	   correlation	   between	   R&D	   investment	   and	   PCT	   applica-­‐tions	   across	   the	   top	  PCT	  applicants.121	  R&D	  expenditure	  however	   ex-­‐plains	   less	   than	   10%	   of	   the	   variation	   in	   patent	   applications.122	   Put	  differently,	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  firms	  with	  relatively	  low	  R&D	  expendi-­‐ture	  still	   file	  a	   large	  number	  of	  patents.	  Patent	  filing	  intensity	  is	   influ-­‐enced	   by	   a	   large	   number	   of	   factors	   which	   still	   embed	   further	  examination.	   These	   surely	   are	   the	   level	   of	   R&D	   and	   business	   R&D	   in	  particular,	  institutional	  incentives	  to	  patent,	  and	  education	  and	  science	  and	  technology	  policies	  and	  more.123	  The	  effect	  of	  economic	  crises	  on	  patenting	  activity	  embeds	  further	  theoretical	  adjustment.	  It	  relates	  to	  a	  second	  parallel	  that	  possibly	  ex-­‐ists	  between	  the	  effects	  of	  economic	  crises	  on	  patenting	  filing	  rates	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  FDI	   inflows	  on	  the	  other.	   Interestingly	  enough,	  FDI	  	  	   118.	   	  See,	  OECD	  Science,	  Technology	  and	  Industry	  Outlook	  2010,	  supra	  note	  55,	  at	  35	  (referring	  to	  Battelle	  and	  R&D	  Magazine,	  2010	  Global	  Funding	  Forecast,	  December,	  United	  States	  (2009)).	  	   119.	   	  See,	  OECD	  Science,	  Technology	  and	  Industry	  Outlook	  2010,	  supra	  note	  55,	  at	  34	  (referring	  to	   See,	  EC,	   Innobarometer	  Policy	  Measures	   for	  Gender	  Equality	   in	   Science,	  EUR	  23314,	   Luxem-­‐burg.	   Adding	   that	   “overall	   200%	   of	   firms	   had	   decreased	   their	   innovation	   expenditures	   in	   the	  previous	  six	  months	  as	  a	  direct	  result	  of	   the	  economic	  downturn,	  while	  9%	  had	   increased	  their	  innovation	  budget.”). 
 120.  See,	  World	  Intellectual	  Property	  Indicators	  2010,	  supra	  note	  26,	  at	  21.	  
 121.  Id.	  	  
 122.  Id.	  	  
 123.  Id.	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  inflow	   rates	   into	   emerging	   economies	   during	   economic	   crises	   offer	  surprising	   stability,	   a	   sizable	   component	   of	   which	   are	   mergers	   and	  acquisitions	  by	  MNEs	  operating	  in	  emerging	  economies.124	  There	  is	   in	  fact	   a	   stable	   record	   showing	   that	   FDI	   flows	   are	   less	   volatile	   as	   com-­‐pared	  with	  other	   foreign	  capital	   flows	   in	   the	   form	  of	  portfolio	   invest-­‐ment	   and	   debt	   how	   economic	   crises.125	   Research	   on	   this	   phenomena	  still	  needs	  to	  account	  for	  the	  intriguing	  resemblance	  with	  the	  effect	  of	  economic	  crises	  on	  patent	  filling	  rates	  across	  the	  development	  divide.	  Surely,	  the	  role	  of	  MNEs	  per	  the	  case	  of	  FDI	  inflows	  is	  similarly	  pivotal.	  In	   an	   influential	   article	   titled	   Fire-­‐Sale	   Foreign	   Direct	   Investment	   and	  
Liquidity	   Crises	   economist	   professors	   Mark	   Aguiar	  and	  Gita	   Gopinath	  provide	  decisive	  evidence	  that	  a	  component	  of	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  FDI	  flows	  in	  the	  1997-­‐1998	  Asian	  crisis	  relates	  to	  the	  merger	  and	  acquisi-­‐tion	  activity	  of	  MNEs.	  So	  much	  so,	  as	  MNEs	  were	  able	  to	  purchase	  do-­‐mestic	  firms	  at	  exemplary	  ‘fire-­‐sale’	  prices.126	  Amidst	   these	  conceptual	   theoretical	  considerations,	  certain	  other	  methodological	   issues	   remain	  outside	   the	   scope	  of	   this	   article.	  To	   re-­‐call,	   a	   high	   probability	  was	   found	   for	   decrease	   in	   patent	   applications	  count	  by	  origin	  under	  crisis	  conditions	  in	  the	  case	  of	  advanced	  econo-­‐mies.	   A	   question	   remain	   however	   as	   to	  whether	   there	   is	   causality	   or	  coincidence	  between	  this	  probability	  and	  economic	  crisis?	  A	  separate	  Granger	   causality	   study	  could	   clarify	   this	   issue.	  Neighboring	   research	  herein	  is	  telling.	  One	  important	  contribution	  is	  worth	  mentioning.	  That	  is	  the	  work	  of	  Lee,	  Lin,	  Chuanfg	  and	  Lee	  who	  estimated	  the	  existence	  of	  dual	  Granger	  causality	  between	  research	  output	  and	  economic	  output	  (measured	  through	  GDP)	  for	  Asian	  countries,	   including	  Taiwan,	  South	  Korea	   and	   Singapore.127	   For	   some	   developed	   countries	   one-­‐way	   cau-­‐sality	  was	  estimated,	  namely	  for	  Norway,	  the	  United	  States,	  Spain	  and	  Israel,	  where	  economic	  output	  changes	  cause	  change	   in	  research	  out-­‐put.	   For	   the	  group	  of	  developing	   countries,	   including	  China,	   India,	   Ja-­‐pan	   and	  Poland,	   no	   causality	   between	   research	   and	   economic	   output	  was	   nevertheless	   found.	   As	   their	   article	   measures	   scientific	   publica-­‐tions	  but	  not	  patent	  filling	  counts	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  the	  research	  output,	  further	  adaptation	  to	  patent	  counts	  could	  be	  illustrative.	  	  	   124.	   	  Mark	  Aguiar	  and	  Gita	  Gopinath,	  supra	  note	  22,	  at	  439	  (Fig	  1	  showing	  capital	  inflows	  into	  East	  Asia	  between	  1986-­‐1999;	  “This	  stability	  in	  FDI	  contrasts	  with	  the	  sharp	  reversals	  in	  portfolio	  flows	  and	  bank	  lending”).	   	   125.	   	  W.	  Carlin,	  A.	  Charlton	  and	  C.	  Mayer,	  supra	  note	  107,	  at	  32.	  	   126.	   	  Aguiar	  and	  Gopinath	  uphold	  that	  M&A	  activity	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  tightening	  of	  liquid-­‐ity	  constraints	  for	  domestically	  owned	  firms.	  See,	  Mark	  Aguiar	  and	  Gita	  Gopinath,	  supra	  note	  22,	  at	  439.	  	  	  	   127.	   	  Ling	   Chu-­‐Lee,	   Pin	   Hua-­‐Lin,	   Yun	  Weng-­‐Chuang	   and	   Yi	   Yang-­‐Lee,	   Research	   Output	   and	  Economic	  Output:	  a	  Granger	  causality	  Test,	  Scientometrics,	  89	  (2011),	  465–478.	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   further	   research	   should	   account	   for	   mitigating	   economic	  variables	   measuring	   the	   effects	   of	   economic	   crisis	   conditions	   on	   pa-­‐tenting	  activity.	  It	  could	  target	  not	  only	  economic	  outputs,	  such	  as	  GDP	  or	  GNI,	  but	  also	  crisis	  conditions	  inputs,	  including	  monetary	  and	  credit	  variables	   and	   interest	   rates.	   More	   particularly,	   such	   measurements	  could	   include	   imports	   and	   exports	   of	   goods	   and	   services,	   current	   ac-­‐count	   balance,	   domestic	   credit	   provided	   by	   financial	   sector	   and	   as	  abovementioned	   also	   foreign	   direct	   investments.	   Studying	   the	   influ-­‐ence	  of	  these	  factors	  on	  patenting	  activity	  could	  help	  to	  locate	  the	  criti-­‐cal	   link	   responsible	   for	   patent	   activity	   and	   suggest	   the	   respective	  counter-­‐cyclical	   policy	   to	   protect	   innovation	   against	   economic	   crisis	  consequences.	   CONCLUSION	  Crisis	   conditions	   influence	   patenting	   activity	   in	   advanced	   and	  emerging	   economies	   differently.	   For	   patent	   applications	   by	   origin	  where	  MNEs	   take	  central	   stage	   this	  difference	   is	  presumably	  evident.	  In	  such	  case,	  annual	  negative	  change	  in	  GDP	  in	  advanced	  economies	  is	  followed	  by	  negative	  change	  in	  the	  count	  of	  patent	  applications,	  origi-­‐nated	   from	   the	   same	   country,	   with	   high	   probability.	   Then	   again,	   in	  emerging	  economies	  patent	  applications	  by	  origin	  are	  essentially	  indif-­‐ferent	   to	   changes	   of	   GDP.	   This	  may	   indicate	   that	   in	   emerging	   econo-­‐mies,	   where	   innovation	   is	   predominantly	   promoted	   by	  multinational	  corporations	  and	  at	   times	   funneled	  by	  FDI	  as	  said,	  patenting	  activity-­‐related	  decisions	  come	  from	  outside	  the	  country.	  In	  such	  cases	  patent-­‐ing	   is	   substantively	   less	   reactive	   to	   economic	   developments	   within	  emerging	  economies	  themselves.	  As	  a	  whole,	  for	  patent	  applications	  count	  by	  origin	  the	  probability	  of	  negative	  annual	  change	  strongly	  and	  negatively	  depends	  on	  annual	  change	   of	   GDP,	   GNI-­‐PPP	   and	   GERD	   respectively	   for	   advanced	   econo-­‐mies.	   In	   balance,	   for	   emerging	   economies	   this	   dependence	   is	   much	  weaker	   and	   in	   the	   case	  of	  GERD	   it	   is	  negligible.	   For	   advanced	  econo-­‐mies	  the	  strongest	  response	  was	  observed	  on	  GDP	  annual	  change	  and	  the	  weakest	  -­‐	  on	  GERD.	  For	  patent	  applications	  by	  office	  where	  the	  numerical	  significance	  of	  MNEs	  is	  unclear	  the	  probability	  of	  negative	  change	  was	  rather	  simi-­‐lar	   for	   advanced	   and	   emerging	   economies	   as	   a	   response	   to	   annual	  change	  of	  the	  economic	  variables.	  For	  non-­‐resident	  patent	  applications	  the	  difference	  between	  advanced	  and	  emerging	  economies	  with	  regard	  to	  their	  response	  to	  annual	  change	  in	  economic	  variables	  was	  negligi-­‐ble.	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  obtained	  results	  may	  indicate	  the	  different	  sources	  of	  patent-­‐ing	   activity	   and	  maybe	   even	   innovation	   at	   large,	   in	   two	   categories	   of	  economies.	   In	   emerging	   economies	   patenting	   activity	   is	   led	   predomi-­‐nantly	   by	   foreign	   and	   multinational	   corporations,	   functioning	   within	  the	   country	   that	   are	   less	   influenced	   by	   domestic	   economic	   develop-­‐ments.	  Business	  decisions	  by	  MNEs	  in	  emerging	  economies	  are	  argua-­‐bly	   done	   less	   as	   a	   response	   to	   economic	   developments	   within	   given	  emerging	   economies.	   Such	   decisions,	   and	   particularly	   over	   patenting	  abroad	  possibly	  are	  part	  of	  a	  less	  dependent	  business	  strategy	  on	  local	  crisis	  conditions	  in	  such	  target	  countries.	  These	   findings	  were	  verified	   for	   two	  specific	  years	  of	  global	  eco-­‐nomic	  crises,	  when	  annual	  change	  in	  economic	  variables	  were	  strongly	  biased	   to	   negative	   values,	   and	   it	  was	   demonstrated	   that	   even	   in	   this	  case	   patent	   applications	   by	   origin	   in	   emerging	   economies	   show	   very	  low	  probability	  of	  negative	  annual	   change	  as	   a	   response	   to	  economic	  development.	   These	   findings	  may	   alternatively	   indicate	   either	   higher	  resistance	  or	  suspended	  response	  by	  emerging	  economies	  to	  economic	  crises.	  This	  and	  other	  alternative	  explanations	  also	  entail	  future	  exam-­‐ination.	  	  
